U.S. Invasion of Grenada - Covert Action Information Bulletin

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INFORMATION BULLETIN

Number 20 $3.00

U.S. Invades Grenada-Nicaragua Next?

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Editorial

The catastrophic events in Grenada have shocked the
world, proving further that this administration is capable of
almost anything. At a time when both Central America and
the Middle East are on the brink of massive conflagrations,
and when the horrors of nuclear war are uppermost in our
minds, such knee-jerk, ideological aggressiveness is terrifying.
We stare in disbelief as eminent scientists debate whether the
nuclear devastation will mean the end of the human race or
merely throw us back to the Stone Age.

We are convinced that the single, most frightening threat to
humanity is the present U.S. government. All our efforts to
expose its lies and deceptions must be redoubled.

Grenada and Nicaragua

The delay in producing and presenting this issue was due to
our efforts to analyze as thoroughly as possible the campaign
of destabilization and warmongering which led to the crushing
of the Grenadian Revolution. We have also summarized the
events of the past few months in Nicaragua, events which have
convinced most observers that a wider war in Central America
is imminent. For those whose greatest concern is nuclear
confrontation— and who among us does not fear that? — it is
crucial to be aware that such a confrontation will likely grow

out of conventional war. The first step is stopping regional
conflicts. Whether greater knowledge of the machina-
tions of the Pentagon, the CIA, and their surrogates will help,
remains to be seen. We believe our role is to provide as much
information as we can.

Our Fifth Anniversary

While the discouraging world scene acts as a slight restraint
on our otherwise boundless enthusiasm, we are nevertheless
proud that we have survived five years of publishing
Covert Act ion Information Bulletin despite the U.S. govern-
ment s attempts to suppress our research and information
through the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. We have
entered our sixth year meeting, we think, our goal of steadily
improving the Bulletin. We have not been immune— like the
CIA— to the economic constrictions of the current recession.
As we struggle to keep our small office and tiny staff going, we
learn that the CIA received $75.5 million in the recent
Intelligence Authorization Act for a new building at its
Headquarters— this separate and apart from a secret budget
for its heinous activities. Such impressive growth is of course
due to expanded CIA covert actions around the globe, about
which we will continue to keep you informed. •

Table of Contents

Editorial 2

U.S. Crushes Grenada 3

Cuban Statements 21

Nicaragua Braces for War 25

Desert Technology 31

Israeli Arms in Central America 34
Pak in the Saddle Again 38
Flight 007 Aptly Named 40
Sources and Methods: CIA

Assassinations — Part IV 44

Cover: Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro at Santiago, Cuba, July 26. 1983. Photo by Prensa Latina.

Cover/Action Information Bulletin. Number 20. Winter 1984, published by Covert Action Publications. Inc.. a District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation.
P O. Box 50272. Washington. DC 20004; telephone (202) 265-3904. All rights reserved: copyright ® 1983 by Covert Action Information Publications. Inc.
Typography by Art for People. Washington. DC; printing by Faculty Press, Brooklyn, NY. Washington staff: Ellen Ray. William Schaap. l.ouis Wolf
Board of Advisers: Philip Agee, Ken Lawrence. Clarence Lusane. Elsie Wilcott, Jim Wilcott. Indexed in the Alternative Press Index. ISSN 0275-309X.

2 Covert Action

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Grenada — No Bishop, No Revo:

U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel

By Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

In retrospect the tragic and horrifying events in Grenada
were almost predictable. They will one day provide yet
another historical perspective of the devastating outcome
when an imperialist intelligence system penetrates an
internally divided, fledgling socialist government, unable to
defend itself, and brings down upon it the might of a massive
military machine.

In the case of Chile, the country's military was used by
U.S. intelligence before and during the overthrow of
Salvador Allende, and enjoys its backing to this day. In
Grenada such backing may have been the expectation of at
least some of the members of the Revolutionary Military
Council which plotted the coup against Maurice Bishop,
leading to his brutal death. Those collaborators, however,
were used and doublecrossed by the Reagan administration.

In both Chile and Grenada, the leadership of the regimes
which were toppled did not have enough trust in the people
to arm them, a fatal mistake. (In Grenada, the People's
Militia, established under Bishop, had been dismantled by
his opponents while he was off the island on a trip shortly
before the coup.)

Where Is the CIA?

The most curious aspect of the coverage of the coup
against Bishop and the subsequent U.S. invasion— Operation
Urgent Fury — is the near absence in the press of any mention
of the CIA or speculation about a CIA hand in the events.
One would think William Casey was not present at George
Bush's National Security Council meetings deciding to
divert the fleet after the death of Bishop, advancing the
incursion plans at a frenzied pace after the Beirut bombing
plotting each step of the invasion. One would think there
were no CI A agents on Grenada after four and a half years of
urgent and persistent endeavors to place them there. One
would think there were no intelligence officers on the island,
directing the Marines and Rangers, or aboard the U.S.S.
Guam directing part of the invasion operation itself.

And yet we know that from the moment of the March 1 3,
1979 revolution in Grenada the CIA has relentlessly used
every trick in its dirty bag to destroy that tiny island's
government and to eliminate that great threat to the U .S.— a

charismatic black leader, loved by his own people and
respected by all who knew him.

Indeed, in looking for comparisons to the murder of
Bishop and his supporters and the destruction of the New
Jewel Movement and the Grenadian Revolution, one thinks
not so much of Chile as the liquidation of the Black Panther
Party and its leaders during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
This was accomplished not simply from internal political or
personal disputes, but by a scientifically executed operation
known as COINTELPRO, through the combined efforts of
the FBI, military intelligence, local police forces, and in
some instances, the CIA itself. Ironically it was the Black
Power movement in the United States which had been an
inspiration for most of the leaders of the New Jewel
Movement, when they were university students, labor
leaders, and political activists.

It is hard, and it is painful, to try to understand how
sophisticated, politically conscious people who aspire to
revolutionary leadership fall prey time and again to the
machinations of those bent on their destruction. It is not as if
there had been no warning. It is now clear that for more than
two years the U.S. government had been moving inexorably
toward the military overthrow of the People's Revolutionary
Government of Grenada. Early on. President Reagan's
advisers recognized that a simple continuation of the Carter
administration's destabilization campaign would not suffice.

The Carter Destabilization Campaign

Within days of the overthrow of the autocratic Eric M.
Gairy, the New Jewel Movement government was bluntly
told by the U.S. not to establish diplomatic relations with
Cuba, to stay out of the socialist camp or else. At the same
time, the paltry sum of $5,000 was offered to counter the open
threat of invasion by Gairy, who was recruiting mercenaries
in the Cuban exile community in Miami. Bishop not only
rebuffed the insulting proposals of Frank Ortiz, the U.S.
Ambassador based in Barbados, but he described his
discussions in detail in a radio broadcast to the Grenadian
people. Less than two months later Grenada was subjected
to the opening salvo in what was to be an unending U.S.
campaign of economic, psychological, and openly violent

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 3

destabilization. Two fires, both of suspicious origin, broke
out simultaneously in the heart of the tourist area, a direct
attack on Grenada's economy. (See CAIB Number 5.)

Bishop again went to the people in a broadcast which
explained the events, in language poignantly prophetic:

Sisters and brothers of Free Grenada: . . . Destabiliza-
tion is the name given the most recently developed or
newest method of controlling and exploiting the lives
and resources of a country and its people by a bigger
and more powerful country through bullying, intimida-
tion, and violence. In the old days such countries- the
colonialist and imperialist powers — sent in gunboats
or marines directly to take over the country by sheer
force. Later on mercenaries were often used in place of
soldiers, navy and marines. Today more and more the
new weapon and the new menace is destabilization. . . .
Destabilization takes many forms; there is propaganda
destabilization, when the foreign media, and some-
times our own Caribbean press, prints lies and
distortions against us; there is economic destabiliza-
tion, when our trade and our industries are sabotaged
and disrupted; and there is violent destabilization,
criminal acts of death and destruction, such as we have
witnessed on Sunday night with the fires. All of these
vicious tactics have been used before, in the recent past
in countries close to us, and in countries far away. As
we the people of Grenada show the world, clearly and
unflinchingly, that we intend to remain free and
independent, that we intend to consolidate and
strengthen the principles and goals of our Revolution,
as we show this to the world, there will be attacks
upon us.

In late 1979 an actual coup attempt was nipped in the bud
when mercenaries' boats were sighted and prevented from
landing the same day that an unsuccessful, AlFLD-inspired
power plant strike was intended to paralyze the island and
leave the entire country that night in darkness. Sophisticated
explosives theretofore unknown on Grenada and collections
of rifles were discovered in the possession of members of a
small gang which had been operating on the island. In raids
on their homes, notes were found denouncingthe Revolution
and extolling the benefits of NATO membership- hardly a
concern of most Grenadians or anyone else in the Caribbean.

In June 1980 a bomb was planted under the grandstand at
Queens Park just before a rally at which Bishop and the rest
of the NJM leadership were to appear. During the rally the
powerful bomb went off below the gathered officials, but
due to inaccurate placement its force was directed downward
toward a group of spectators under the grandstand, rather
than upward toward its intended targets. Three young girls
were killed and scores were injured. In a subsequent
shootout with the remnants of the gang mentioned above,
several of its members were killed. A recent item in the
Periscope column of Newsweek magazine (November 7,
1983) may well relate to that gang. Intended to support the
CIA's incredible claim that it had no agents on Grenada, the
item said:

... a number of knowledgeable sources point to the
reduction in Caribbean intelligence operations made
during the Carter administration. Those cuts left the
United States with no agents based in Grenada. After
the Marxist coup in 1979, the Central Intelligence
Agency tried to remedy that situation. Several
operatives died trying to infiltrate the island.

Of course, under Gairy there was little reason to have
agents on Grenada other than the run-of-the-mill AIFLD
hacks. But all of the incidents noted above occurred after the
revolution and during the Carter administration; they do not
suggest an unwillingness to act forcefully against Grenada.
Moreover, the only known deaths during the period in
question, other than the victims of the Queens Park
bombing, were gang members.

Two victims of CIA/counterrevoluntionary bombing. The human
reality of U.S. destabilization against Grenada.

Just before these attacks, a new U.S. ambassador replaced
the crude Ortiz in Barbados— a replacement he had told the
NJM would be "the velvet glove" in the Caribbean. Sally
Shelton, an ambitious former secretary to the reactionary
Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen (see CAIB Number 10),
deported herself no better, however. After two trips there she
refused to visit further. She sent in her place a seemingly
unprepossessing political officer, Ashley Wills, whom
Bishop soon suspected of involvement in CIA activities on
the island. At a government reception Wills smugly
announced to a CA IB editor that the U.S. did not need the
CIA in the Eastern Caribbean because the local people told
them everything they wanted to know. As noted below. Wills
later turned up on the U.S.S. Guam assisting the invasion
force with his extensive knowledge of the island and its
people having visited often under both Carter and Reagan.
No modest bureaucrat, Wills, who had been assigned

4 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

previously to South Africa and Romania, took credit during
Shelton's tenure for establishing the Voice of America on
Antigua, handling the "political" duties for the area, and
writing Shelton's speeches. It would be interesting to know
the extent of his more recent involvement with Shelton when
she, Peter Bourne, and Robert Pastor were advising Hudson
Austin's RMC government after the death of Bishop. It
would be extremely interesting to know what interrogation
or debriefing duties he might have had on board the Guam

Sally Shelton: Business as usual at Barbados Embassy.

with the captured RMC leader Austin, his deputy Liam
James, or with Bernard Coard, his wife Phyllis Coard, or his
deputy Selwyn Strachan.

In any event, the suggestion that there were no CIA
officers or agents on Grenada at the time of the coup and
invasion is preposterous. It is also apparently contradicted
by the New York Times and Newsweek, among others.
New sweeps reporter described an "older" medical school
student, a former U.S. consul in Laos and State Department
dropout, communicating by shortwave radio with the U.S.
invaders (quoted in detail below). And the New York Times
(October 28, 1983) ran a small but startling item noting that
William Casey was to meet with members of the Senate
Intelligence Committee to discuss CIA involvement in
Grenada. While no committee member would talk about the
subject on the record, an unnamed Senator "said he had
received information that CIA agents were among the
passengers on a planeload of 70 American medical students
flown out of Grenada Wednesday." During the secret
congressional briefings. Pentagon officials informed
Members of Congress that they had known of the impending
coup against Bishop two weeks in advance.

With this background, it is helpful to review the
developments during the Reagan administration.

The Changing Plan of Reagan

At the end of his term, in a futile bid for reelection,
President Carter created the Caribbean Rapid Deployment
Force, which staged exercises at Guantanamo Naval Base on
Cuba — military posturing which Bishop denounced at the
United Nations as a return to gunboat diplomacy and a
revival of the Monroe Doctrine. The American people did
not forgive the Tehran hostage rescue debacle, however, and
the next month Carter lost the election. Shortly thereafter,
when Reagan took over, he embarked on a game plan which
would lead to the actual use of those forces.

Promising to shore up the CI A and to stop the"Marxists"
in Grenada from threatening their democratic "neighbors"
Trinidad and Tobago (a single country, a fact of which
Reagan was apparently not aware), Reagan nevertheless
kept his campaign promises. Shortly after he took office, he
sent Jeane Kirkpatrick to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and
Uruguay to urge the fascist countries of the Southern Cone
to develop a joint security treaty. This persistent preoccu-
pation of the administration with organizing unity among
right-wing countries eventually culminated in the formation
of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
and the revival of the Central American Defense Council
(Condeca).

Some of the steps leading up to the military invasion of
Grenada were:

• On April 27, 198 1 an odd and rather motley collection
of ten Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis were arrested in New
Orleans just as they were about to depart with a plan to
invade Dominica. They were quietly rushed to trial and
convicted. (See CAIB Numbers 13 and 16.) Some of the
testimony revealed that their original intention was to
invade Grenada but that the goal was too difficult a military
undertaking. A recent interview in the Jackson, Mississippi
Clarion- Ledger (October 30, 1983) with one of the
participants, George Malvaney, is instructive. "I wonder
how the government can get away with doing the same thing
I spent 1 8 months in jail for?" he mused. "I really thought it
would help this country to overthrow that government,
which was kind of Marxist oriented, and replace it with a
government more friendly to ours." Apparently whoever
promised George $3,000 for the action never told him that
Dominica already had a government favorable to the U.S. in
the person of Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, who
appeared with President Reagan when he announced the
Grenada invasion on television, shortly after it had begun.
Charles's manipulation and use by the President was so
blatant that she was described on the floor of Congress by
Rep. Gus Savage (Dem. -111.) as "this puppet of our President
[who] represents 'Aunt Jemimaism' in geopolitics."

Eugenia Charles's Freedom Party had been elected in
Dominica with considerable support from the U.S. Embassy
in Barbados (see CAIB Number 10). After the arrest of the
would-be invaders, she clamored for a regional security
treaty to protect against mercenaries, and at her urging the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States was inaugurated
on June 18, 1981. As we later discover, the only reason for
this organization seems to have been to provide an entity to
be told by the U.S. to ask for a U.S. invasion.

• A number of leaks to journalists in 1983 confirmed that
in the summer of 1 98 1 , CI A Director Casey had proposed a

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 5

covert action plan against both Grenada and Suriname (see
sidebar) which was, in the words of one Senator, so "off the
wall" that it was dropped. According to the Washington
Post (February 27, 1983), it was members of the Senate
Intelligence Committee who objected so strenuously.
However, it was clear from the leaks and the context and
timing in which they arose that the plan for Grenada was
never dropped, but was just sent back to the drawing board.
In fact, the recent leaks were probably designed to test the
waters. The covert action plan which was postponed was
apparently connected with the next step of the overall plan-
military maneuvers which were capable of becoming an
actual invasion.

• Over a six-week period in the fall of 198 1 , according to
Grenadian security forces, there were seven incidents of
sabotage, suspected to have been of CI A origin, which could
have been connected to an invasion plan.

• In October 1981 a massive U.S. naval exercise. Ocean
Venture '81, was conducted in the Caribbean, including a
mock invasion of "Amber and the Amberdines, ,, an open
reference to Grenada and the Grenadines. The Amber
operation involved a rescue of Americans being held
hostage by the Amber government, and its mission was "to

install a regime favorable to the way of life we espouse/ 1
according to Pentagon literature. Grenada denounced the
naval maneuvers, suggesting that a real invasion was
imminent. The parallels to what happened two years later
are inescapable. Pentagon rumors at the outset of the
October 1983 invasion— which later found their way into
print, keeping everyone on edge— even stated that General
Austin was holding hostages (two "non- American" women).
And although the medical school students were neither
hostages nor in danger. President Reagan, with inexorable
logic, noted that they might have been.

• In order to make the invasion of Grenada a "sure
thing," Reagan visited Barbados Prime Minister Tom
Adams in April 1982 to discuss the "spread of the virus of
communism" from Grenada. According to Karen DeYoung
of the Washington Post (October 26, 1983), Adams said at
the time he did not feel that either Grenada or Cuba posed a
military threat to his island. Not so with another participant
at the meeting, Jamaica Prime Minister Edward Seaga, who
owed his own election victory over Michael Manley to
considerable U.S. intelligence collaboration. Shortly there-
after Seaga was awarded a medal by Reagan at the White
House In November that year Seaga led an unsuccessful

Pressure in Paramaribo

"U.S. diplomats in the capital of Paramaribo made
sure to keep Bouterse current on evidence that Cuba had
aided the Grenadian coup, and the rest was left to his
well-prepped paranoia."— Newsw eek, November 7, 1983.

The fact is that for more than two years the U.S. had
been working to force Suriname's military government,
headed by Lt. Col. Desi Bouterse, to bow to American
demands that they distance themselves from Cuba.
Although two CIA paramilitary plans to overthrow his
regime, in 1981 and 1982, were shelved because of
congressional opposition, they were replaced by a
campaign of massive economic and political pressure.
The campaign went into high gear in May of this year.

Relations between Bouterse and western governments
were at a low in December 1982 after the killing of 14
opposition leaders in Suriname. The Netherlands quickly
suspended its massive aid program (of more than $100
million per year, with ten years to run). Then Brazil, with
U.S. backing, began to make overtures to Bouterse and,
ultimately, to provide, with conditions, some desperately
needed economic and military assistance. Pressure was
put on the regime to reduce its relations with Cuba and
Grenada, and, contrary to the subsequent media disin-
formation and despite the suspicious timing, agreement
to curtail drastically relations with Cuba had been
reached before the arrest and murder of Maurice Bishop.

In late September an advance team went from
Suriname to the U.S. to prepare for Bouterse's October
address to the U.N. The level of U.S. influence was

revealed when Suriname quietly acceded to American
insistence that left-leaning Foreign Minister Harvey
Naarendorp not be a member of the delegation. Prime
Minister Errol Alibux handled most of the negotiations,
meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
America, Langhorne A. Motley.

At the U.N., Alibux was invited to attend a reception
by President Reagan and was greeted by Secretary of
State Shultz. The contrast with Bishop's frustrating U.S.
visit a few months earlier could not have been more
evident. Moreover, it was clear from Bouterse's later
speech at the U.N. that he had already recognized the
stark necessity of toeing the U.S. line. His call for the
removal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and
Afghanistan (but not from El Salvador or Honduras) was
hardly independent thinking.

When Bouterse expelled virtually all Cubans the very
day the Rangers landed in Grenada, U.S. officials and
Latin American allies were elated. "All of a sudden," one
Surinamese diplomat told a reporter, "the Americans at
the U nited Nations are smiling at us and patting us on the
backs." Elliott Abrams, Reagan's human rights expert,
pointed to Surname as an example of the effectiveness of
the administration's policies in that area. But Bouterse is
above all a pragmatist who has fended off numerous coup
attempts in nearly four years in power, caretully
balancing his political alliances. Yielding, for the time
being, to overwhelming pressure does not mean embrac-
ing the imperialist banner, and it must be hoped that time
and historical imperatives will bring Suriname back into
the progressive camp. *

6 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

attack against Grenada at the meeting of the Caribbean
Community (Caricom), by which the U.S. had hoped to
embarrass the Bishop government.

• By the spring of 1 983 the invasion plan was in high gear.
In March Reagan fulminated over the Cuban help for
the international airport construction in a TV address to the
nation, replete with sinister satellite photographs. As Gre-
nada's U.N. Ambassador Caldwell Taylor pointed out at the
time, spy photographs were hardly necessary, as picnickers
and joggers from the medical school, as well as the general
public, had open access to the airport site. Although no one
knowledgeable on the subject ever bought the President's
argument that the airport was "too big" for mere tourism, or
that it was a secret military installation, the media continued
to play up the charge, and the American public was taken in
with the big lie that tiny Grenada was a threat to U.S.
security. At the same time, authoritative military journals
were decrying the threat to the chokepoints of U.S. oil
tanker lanes, another myth, since Grenada had no navy.
President Reagan, during this TV address, had the audacity
to joke, "What is at stake in Grenada is not nutmeg. It is U.S.
national security." (See CAIB Number 19.)

• In April, after the President's dog and pony show, the
leaders of Barbados apparently were still not convinced of
the necessity of a military solution. Though Barbados had
obvious enmity for the Bishop government. Foreign Minis-
ter Louis Tull told Edward Cody of the Washington Post
(April 24, 1983), in a remarkable interview, "We cannot
resolve it with the more extreme position that the United
States might be disposed to take. 1 don't expect the govern-
ment of Grenada to back off. They've gone too far. You have
to live with them." Still, Tull spoke highly of the Regional
Defense System agreement (from which Grenada was ex-
cluded) to share intelligence and promote military coopera-
tion. He contrasted this development with the failure of the
U.S. to provide any aid under the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive. "I would say that all the countries of the Eastern Carib-
bean are very concerned about security matters, more con-
cerned than they have been in a number of years," he con-
fided. But they were still more interested in the fact that
Grenada had received over $23 million in foreign aid in
1982 — from Cuba, East Germany, the Soviet Union, the
EEC, and Canada. "It does create a feeling of disillusionment

among the micro Caribbean states when they find they are
getting relatively— I want to be fair — relatively less aid than
Cuba or Grenada," he concluded.

• Shortly thereafter the Barbados Defense Forces,
according to a Caribbean Contact expose by editor Ricky
Singh, began to receive training in the United States under
the direction of the CIA.

• Then, a few months before Bishop's assassination and
the invasion, U.S. diplomats traveled to Jamaica and
Barbados to finalize military intervention plans. According
to unnamed high government officials of those two
countries, "unidentified U.S. officials had been seeking for
several months to . . . isolate Grenada, and had urged the
regional governments to consider military action against
Grenada." (Washington Post, October 28, 1983.) And. as
noted more fully below, two weeks before the house arrest of
Bishop, U.S. Army Rangers in Seattle were practicing
parachute landings and the takeover of an airfield. In a
moment of weakness Tom Adams almost gave the plan
away when he tried to convince Grenadian Foreign Minister
Unison Whiteman not to return to Grenada while Bishop was
under house arrest. Later Adams claimed that the U.S. had
approached him with a vague plan to rescue Bishop.

Several observations stem from this review of events
preceding the invasion. First of all, it is abundantly clear
that there were U.S. intelligence agents active on Grenada; a
military operation of that size would never have been
undertaken otherwise. This was clear from the October 28
New York Times story about the CIA agents brought out in
the airlift of the medical students. Newsweek (November 7,
1983) confirmed the presence of at least one of them in its
carefully worded report:

MYSTERY MAN: At the Grand Anse campus an
older student named Jim Pfister assured everyone that
help was on the way. Pfister was a thin man with a
moustache, probably in his late 30s, and even his fellow
students found him unusual. He claimed to be a West
Point graduate and former Foreign Service officer, a
U.S. consul in Laos during the Vietnam War, who had
quit the State Department to go to medical school.
Once the invasion started, he was in constant
shortwave radio contact with the advancing troops
and seemed to know their moves in advance. Before
they arrived, he instructed the other students to
prepare for evacuation by putting on long pants and
running shoes.

Indeed it appears likely that there were one or more
"moles"high in the New Jewel Movement itself. This should
not be either shocking or improbable. The CI A and military
intelligence had four and a half years to accomplish this task,
and there is hardly a country in the world where there are no
mercenary collaborators to be found. The temptations of
an unlimited expense account are great. But, as has
happened before, the collaborators in Grenada were
doublecrossed. Moreover, there were more than 1,000
Americans on the island — students, teachers, businessmen,
retirees, and a constant influx of tourists.

The Medical School

The St. George's Medical School, established in Grenada
in 1977 by Charles Modica, the son of a conservative Long
Island Republican, formed immediate and close ties with the

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 7

government of Eric Gairy. The vice-chancellor of the school.
Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, prides himself today for having been
an "adviser" to all the governments of Grenada, including
that of the short-lived Revolutionary Military Council of
General Austin.

In fact, members of the New Jewel Movement, particularly
Maurice Bishop, were suspicious of the school from its
inception. Long portrayed by the American and European
press as a harmless despot interested only in Hying saucers,
Gairy was in reality a vicious dictator who was the only
Caribbean leader to maintain diplomatic relations with
Pinochet's Chile, and who sent a dozen or more members of
his notorious security forces there for training. When they
returned to Grenada, "disappearances" became frequent,
the best known case involving a police chief who was friendly
totheNJM. And, Bishop told CAIBona visit to the U.S. in
1978, accompanying the newly trained security forces on their
return from Chile were coffins which were unloaded and
shipped to the medical school. Bishop said that his
movement believed the coffins contained the cadavers of
"disappeared" people from Chile, and that Gairy was
planning a body trade-off with the fascist Junta. He did not
get the chance, however, because a few months later, on
March 13, 1979, the criminal Gairy dictatorship was
overthrown.

Over the next four years there occurred a series of
suspicious incidents involving the medical school, but the
Bishop government, unwisely as it turned out, opted to allow
the school to remain. This was partly because of the revenue
it represented to Grenada (20% of its foreign exchange,
according to Peter Bourne, son of the school's vice-
chancellor) and partly because the new government thought
it would be relatively easy to keep an eye on the overwhelm-
ingly white, middle-class students and faculty. (See sidebar.)
This was perhaps a fatal mistake of the Bishop government;
the school's presence gave perfect cover to intelligence
officers who had ample time to recruit their local
collaborators.

A stunning admission regarding the school's connection
with the Reagan administration appeared as a throwaway
line in a long Washington Post analysis on November 23,
1983. When Bishop met with then National Security Adviser
William Clark on June 7, 1983, he was informed, according
to the Post's sources, that if he did not tone down his
anti-American rhetoric, Grenada could lose the school—
and its foreign exchange. "Consideration was being given to
providing surplus U.S. property on Antigua as another site."
So much for the private nature of the institution. And four
months later, of course, the school became the excuse for the
U.S. invasion.

The Fires

On May 6, 1979, less than two months after the revolution
in Grenada and just a few weeks after Bishop's confrontation
over Cuba with the U.S. Ambassador, two fires were set
within an hour of one another. The first burned down a
tourist cottage across from the medical school's Grand Anse
beach campus. When neighbors rushed to get the school's
fire-fighting wagon, they discovered it had been sabotaged.
By the time St. George's only fire truck had driven from the
center of town to the cottage, it was completely destroyed.
And while the truck was at Grand Anse, a building just two
blocks from the fire station downtown began to burn. It
housed the leading travel agency and tour operation. When

the firefighters got back to town, extensive damage had
already been done— tickets and tour arrangements for the
coming year had been burned. Nearby kerosene cans con-
firmed a case of arson.

At Grand Anse later that evening security personnel
arrested a young, drug-addicted medical school student who
had lived in the burned cottage. Upon questioning, he
admitted he had set the fire, but first insisted the "devil"
made him do it. Later he admitted that it was two men from
New Jersey, possibly Cuban exiles.

Carter Administration Ties

The school itself has always had interesting ties to U.S.
politics, both Democrat and Republican. One of its
founders, vice-chancellor Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, is the father

FIMS

That the American people were the target of their
government's disinformation and media manipulation
is clear. This included the medical school students as
well as the general public. The media attention devoted
to those who were airlifted home, however, obscured
the fact that the ground kissers had been bullied into
their action. First they were terrorized by the U.S. war
which raged around their dormitories and then they
were browbeaten by the intelligence agents who
accompanied them in their exodus from Grenada.

In fact, most of the students had insisted from the
beginning that they did not consider themselves in any
danger before the U.S. invasion; only afterwards,
when the Marines combined the evacuation of the
students with attacks on the Cuban construction
workers nearby, did the students feel threatened, and
with good reason. As Mike Royko noted in the
Chicago Sun- Times, "It's kind of like a fireman setting
fire to a building, then shouting to the occupant: 'Don't
worry, I'll save you.' "

Still the U.S. had fertile soil in which to plant its
propaganda. While there are stories of a few students
who worked tirelessly to help the victims of the
invasion, not many supported the Grenadian people or
their government, and some resorted to crude, racist
epithets: "Half the med students didn't like the
Grenadians. Students called them FIGs, 'fucking
ignorant Grenadians,' " one student's friend told the
Village Voice. This was an ironic comment, coming
from a student body made up of people unable to get
into American medical schools. Perhaps the most
revealing comment was made by one student, Linda
Simms of Takoma Park, Maryland: "I wasn't afraid
for my life so much as I feared for my lifestyle."

Senator D'Amato didn't let their lifestyle suffer,
however. As a reward for their maleability he arranged
for them to continue their studies in several Long
Island schools which had not accepted them aca-
demically in the first place. •

8 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 198

of Dr. Peter G. Bourne, who was a special White House
adviser on drug abuse during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations, until he was forced to resign in 1979 in a
drug scandal, accused of writing Quaalude prescriptions for
staffers and their friends. In 1978, Peter Bourne had been
implicated by political activists in New York in the
mysterious death of a progressive doctor working for a
Lincoln Hospital drug detoxification program which was
opposed to the methadone maintenance programs of Nelson
Rockefeller. Bourne was the last person known to have seen
the doctor alive, but as far as is known his involvement was
never investigated.

In 1977, C4/Z? staff members saw documentary proof that
Peter Bourne provided debriefing reports to the CIA after
taking trips abroad, including to Southeast Asia and
Pakistan. The details of this story later appeared in the
Chicago Sun-Times (July 23, 1978).

The Strategy Paper

The Bournes were deeply involved with the short-lived
Austin regime, and after the U.S. invasion, Peter Bourne
rushed to tell their side of the story. In a long piece in the
November 6 Los Angeles Times and in interviews on
National Public Radio, Bourne claimed he was against
the invasion. He also insisted that a U.S. intelligence
team on Grenada could have obtained the same information
he did, by playing softball with the Cuban construction
workers and by having dinner with the Cuban Ambassador
and his American-born wife, information which, according
to Bourne, included "the numbers of Cuban military and
civilian personnel, the extent to which Grenada was being
armed, and Cuba's intentions on the island." This sort of
information was just the kind Bourne had in the past
transmitted to the CIA after his travels. (Bourne never notes
that an invasion might have endangered the school's multi-
million dollar investment on Grenada.)

While Bishop was under house arrest, Bourne claimed, his
father. Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, began to meet with Bernard
Coard, who guaranteed the safety of the students. Even after
Bishop's death, for which the Bournes evidently shed no
tears. Bourne senior continued to meet with Coard,
arranging for government vehicles so the students could
travel freely from campus to campus. Then, curiously, the
elder Dr. Bourne began to meet with Gen. Austin on
government policy matters and told his son that Austin was
not so bad, that he did not seem "particularly sympathetic to
the Marxist cause, "and, in an interesting choice of words, he
seemed to be "on the right," wanting to "move the country
back toward democracy."

Of Bishop, the kindest words Peter Bourne could conjure
up were that "his early Marxist-tinged rhetoric reflected as
much his inexperience as his ideological commitment."

Meanwhile, the State Department and the U.S. Ambas-
sador to Barbados, Milan Bish, began to pressure both
Charles Modica, who was in New York on a visit, and a
"distinguished and conservative" trustee of the medical
school, to claim publicly that students in Grenada were in
danger, in order to give the administration a pretext to
invade. Peter Bourne counseled both men that the school
might be liable for any injuries suffered by the students if
they complied. Still, the "distinguished and conservative"
trustee, who can only be New York Senator Alfonse
D'Amato, later an apologist for the invasion, muttered that

he would like to "kick out the commies" anyway. (D'Amato,
it will be recalled, spearheaded the disinformation campaign
against Cuba, falsely accusing its government of drug
trafficking. See CAIB Number 19.)

According to Bourne, his father then interceded with
Austin to allow U.S. representatives onto the island to meet
with the students. This is corroborated by medical students
and an American observer invited on campus for the U.S.
Embassy briefing. According to the November 1 1 Militant,
Akinyele, an American living in Grenada and working for
Radio Free Grenada until he was evacuated with the
students, explained that the two U.S. representatives sought
to calm the fears of the students. One derided a rumor that
parents of the students in New York were trying to organize
charter flights to rescue their children. He also assured the
students that Gen. Austin had said they could leave any time
they wanted and that the airport would be open the
following day. This accords with Bourne's account that the
U.S. government was actually meeting with Austin. But,
although the airport was open the next day, U.S. officials in
Barbados would not allow scheduled commercial planes to
fly to Grenada, having already made final plans for
the invasion.

Despite such assurances on Sunday, the previous Friday,
according to Newsday (October 26, 1983), "U.S. intelligence
was providing information about the landing sites, the
location of coral reefs, and the basing of Grenada's security
forces. The aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence, heading
toward Lebanon, was told to swing by Grenada."

On Monday, Peter Bourne said, his father contacted him a
last time, asking him to help provide Austin with some
guidance to move his country "back toward democracy."
The younger Bourne spent the day with former Carter
National Security Council member Robert Pastor and with
help from Carter's former Ambassador to the Eastern
Caribbean, Sally Shelton, they drafted a position paper for
Austin — suggesting how he could distance himself from the
Bishop government and pander to U.S. demands. Apparently
having been assured by the Reagan administration that an
invasion was not imminent, Bourne had a summary of the
paper read to his father by phone, intending to have the full
text telexed the next day. This never happened, as by dawn
the next morning the invasion was under way.

In the various subsequent accounts of the writing of the
strategy paper for General Austin, the participants minimize,
or fail to mention, their own roles, rushing to cover their
tracks. Robert Pastor, in a Washington Post piece the day
after the invasion, neglected to mention his connection with
the RMC government. And in a puff piece interview with
Sally Shelton in the New York Times society section
(November 3, 1983), she too fails to take credit where credit
is due. She is far more disingenuous than Pastor, who did
criticize the invasion. "Large quantities of arms and caches of
documents in Grenada," she said, "have just about
convinced me that the invasion was justified." [Emphasis
added.] She will testify to that effect, she confided to the
interviewer, to the House Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs.

Perhaps an impending government job will convince the
ambitious Ambassador completely. Currently, she is
Caribbean director of International Business-Government
Counsellors, Inc., a risk assessment service for which former
CIA Director William Colby is senior adviser.

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 9

An outrageous "expose" of the whole affair was presented
by a White House aide, writing under the pseudonym Val
Victorson. in Reverend Moon's Washington Times
(November 10, 1983). Taking both Pastor and Bourne to
task for advising Austin— a doublecross if ever there was
one— the White House aide failed to mention Shelton's
collaboration on the strategy paper.

Finally there is the matter of Charles M odica's conversion.
Only after the students had returned to a maudlin, media-
hyped reception did he "realize" that Reagan's invasion—
which he had been criticizing constantly — was justified. "I
found out that the people I had been dealing with were not
fully in charge of that government," he said on emerging
from a'special State Department briefing.

The "Internal" Struggles

Who u as "fully in charge" of the government of Grenada
at the time of the coup and the invasion? Certainly not, as
U.S. officials and much of the media would have it, Bernard
Coard or even Hudson Austin. It was, as one State
Department spokesman claimed, "a floating crap game,"
but one in which the U.S. was doing the rolling.

We may never know exactly what happened the day
Bishop was killed, or who gave what orders. We may never
know who were the moles on the Central Committee
(though it will be interesting to see who fades from sight

Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and Army Commander Hudson
Austin during celebration of second anniversary of revolution.

during the show trials sure to come). But progressive people
must examine and openly criticize the horrendous errors
which were made by the opponents of Maurice Bishop, to
learn from those fatal mistakes. What happened in Grenada
has affected the entire socialist world.

That there was such a deep split within the leadership of
the New Jewel Movement— and clearly there was— was not
as well known to insiders, friends of Grenada and even some
of its ambassadors, as it was to the recipients of intelligence
"leaks." For example, a front-page story by Barbara
Crossette in the August 7, 1983 Sunday New York Times
sought to play on the racist fears of establishment conserv-
atives as well as anti-communist liberals, while pointing out.
for the first time, rumors of a split. It warned that Bishop
"spoke about ... the need to reject the system of government
inherited from the British and to build a new society on
Grenada." Bishop, she pointed out, "is not alone in the
Caribbean in seeking to reject Western European political
and economic models. . . . Intellectuals in many Caribbean
islands— raised in an age of civil rights and black power and
educated at some of Europe's and North America's best
universities— are speaking and writing on this theme. " The
article encourages near hysteria on the part of the
establishment: "John Compton, who pushed back a strong
challenge from the left to become Prime Minister of St.
Lucia, said that he believed the democratic governments of
the region, with the help of North America and Western
Europe, had only three or four years to prove themselves
economically."

But Crossette had some hope for the establishment too:
"Public support for the Government of Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop," she said, "is diminishing rapidly as Cuban
and Soviet influence here grows, according to many
Grenadians." Finally she noted, "Mr. Coard, Deputy Prime
Minister, and Mrs. Coard, head of the National Women's
Organization, are considered by many Grenadians to be
among the most radical members of the Government, and
there are rumors of a rift between the Coards and
Mr. Bishop."

She was totally wrong in her account of Bishop's lack of
popularity, and as for the Coards being "more Marxist, a
favorite media refrain, there is no evidence of this. On the
contrary, events have proved that Bishop was far more in
touch with the people and far more interested in their
welfare. The grafitti on a truck, shown in many U.S.
newspapers after the invasion, told it all: "No Bishop, No
Work, No Revo."

A most fundamental mistake was made when Coard and
his followers ordered Bishop placed under house arrest. If
they did not at the time see the enormity of the act, the
dissident Central Committee members should have under-
stood the meaning of the tremendous crowd which freed
Bishop.

Events leading up to the liberation of Bishop from house
arrest bear close scrutiny. It was clear to Coard and his
followers that the populace did not support them, so they
were striving, even at that late date, for a compromise with
Bishop. He had said that he would decide by 10 o'clock that
night whether to accept their demands. However, curiously,
shortly before 8 p.m. a huge, well organized crowd
approached Bishop's house, with many participants who
were not known Bishop supporters, inlcuding counter-
revolutionary elements and contingents with anti-communist
banners and slogans. This crowd materialized even though

10 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

some of Bishop's main supporters were already in jail for
organizing other demonstrations in his support, and his
followers were generally in disarray.

Bishop partisans, such as Einstein Louison, even refused
to participate in the march when they saw the nature of the
crowd. Well known businessmen were leading it, men who
never had supported Bishop, as well as a truckload of
demonstrators from the Coca-Cola company. Bishop
allowed himself to be freed by this crowd because, he said, he
felt he could control them, and he decided to make a critical
speech at the market square where there were no soldiers.
Some of his followers took Bishop in a car, but, because he
was so weak from the days of house arrest they decided to go
first to the hospital. However, apparently the car never
reached the hospital, but turned up the road to Fort Rupert.
Subsequent reports which gave the impression that Fort
Rupert was a well armed fortification are in error. It was
essentially an administrative post, with no more than 20
rifles in the entire installation, a fact well known on the
island.

At the fort, Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, and a few others
went into a small building, the "situation room." According
to a friend of Creffs, who arrived at the fort accompanied by
Creft's parents, bringing food for the group, they knew
nothing about what was happening outside the fort until the
fighting began. According to witnesses, the first indication
Bishop and the others had of armed conflict was when three
explosions were heard, sounding like grenades or small
bombs. They cracked the walls and ceiling of the situation
room and the people inside fell to the floor.

Outside, three armored personnel carriers had arrived.
They had been sent to Fort Rupert by the members of the
Central Committee who had rushed to Fort Frederick, the
real army arsenal, after Bishop had been freed. As the
massive crowd gathered outside Fort Rupert the soldiers,
apparently panicked by the explosions, opened fire on them,
killing and wounding large numbers. Although the demon-
strators were apparently unarmed, three soldiers who had
been sent to Fort Rupert from Fort Frederick were killed,
suggesting the presence of provocateurs.

There are a number of unanswered questions. Why was a
rally set for 8 o'clock when there was a deadline for a
decision on compromise of 10 o'clock? Who organized this
rally, planned so well, and in advance? Why did the car go to
Fort Rupert, which was an indefensible position? The rally
set for the market square might have been peaceful; Bishop
had told the people freeing him that he did not want anyone
hurt. A key statement to the population might have set the
stage for some sort of return to normalcy. But the rally never
took place. Instead, troops were sent to confront the crowd
and something provoked them, leading to a massacre
followed by assassinations.

The executions of Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Unison
Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Fitzroy Bain, and Noel Bain
which followed the murderous attack on the people at Fort
Rupert were not accidents. Though the initial firing on the
crowd might not have been premeditated, at least 15 minutes
elapsed from the time Bishop and his supporters surrendered
to the Army men and the time they were assassinated. While
this was not time enough for an RMC meeting, it was time
enough to radio for instructions.

There could have been communications with Coard or
with Austin or with the intelligence officers at the medical
school, or with anyone else for that matter. What happened

Maurice Bishop and Deputy Bernard Coard.

and how many people died at Fort Rupert will be the subject
of a bitterly contested show trial to be organized by the U.S.
against Coard, Austin, et al. "A Sandhurst graduate" who
sources identify as the MI-6 officer on the island claimed to
Newsday (November 13, 1983) that he watched the shooting
through an 80-power telescope and, though he did not see
the aftermath, estimated that at least 50 people died. He will
undoubtedly be called as a witness. Verdicts reached in the
trial will always be suspect, and the events of October 19 a
horrible shadowy nightmare. But if the reports are true that
Bernard Coard said when captured he was "not respons-
ible" — this was an unconscionable attempt to avoid
accountability.

Don Rojas, Bishop's former press secretary, put it best
(Washington Post, October 31, 1983):

Perhaps the biggest historical irony is that the man
considered the most developed, best ideologue in the
Grenada revolution, a brilliant man, through a funda-

( ^

State Secrets

In late October a local Washington, DC television
station revealed that inmates of nearby Lorton Reform-
atory had in their possession photocopies of numerous
highly secret State Department documents. In the
ensuing scandal it was revealed that the documents had
been left inadvertently in a used safe sent to the prison
for repairs. The news coverage centered on the lax
security measures which allowed the shipment of the
documents, but never discussed the contents of the
documents themselves. CAIB has learned that many of
the documents related directly to the proposed overthrow
of the government of Grenada, but that reporters aware
of this were cowed into suppressing the information. •

v. )

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Covert Action 11

mental error of judgment and personal ambition, in the
end gave the Grenadian revolution on a platter to the
U.S. with all the trimmings.

That the Coards and their allies and the members of the
RMC did not fight to the death against the U.S. invaders
underscores the fact that they had no idea what they were
doing after Bishop was dead, indeed from the time they
placed him under house arrest. The people of Grenada were
done a terrible disservice by these ultra-leftists; it will take
years to revivify the Grenadian Revolution and reinstate the
promise of Maurice Bishop, a hero and a martyr.

Crocodile Tears Over Bishop

The hypocrisy of the U.S. government and its official
media after the coup against Bishop was beyond belief.

suggesting a definite method to its madness. The day after
Bishop was placed under house arrest, the Voice of America
broadcast to Latin America and the Caribbean profiles of
Bishop and Coard, portraying Bishop as a world-renowned,
moderate, civil rights hero— the same Bishop it had
excoriated relentlessly for four years, and picturing Coard as
a brutal Stalinist. In fact, the VOA's report on Bishop could
only be described as an obituary, an ominous suggestion of
things to come. And, the reports said, there was "mounting
evidence" that Cuba was behind the downfall of Bishop. The
networks followed suit; both NBC and ABC referred to a
"leftist" regime being overthrown by a "Marxist" regime, as
Alex Cockburn noted in the November 8 Village Voice.

Don Rojas told the Washington Post that Bishop had
instructed him the night of his death "to tell the world that
Cuba had nothing to do with the regime's internal dispute."

12 Covert Action

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Curiously, while many journalists were printing the Reagan
administration's disinformation about the "mounting
evidence" of Cuban involvement, Cuban exiles in Miami
were regaling the New York Times (November 4, 1983) with
the story that Cuban Colonel Tortola had flown to Grenada
the day before the U.S. invasion to topple Austin's
Revolutionary Military Council.

The references to Austin were also peculiar. Hudson
Austin, trained by the British in Jamaica as a prison guard
and constable, is consistently referred to by the media as a
"Marxist,'" and as a close supporter of Bernard Coard,
allegedly the most hard-line of all. Yet when the statements
of the RMC are reviewed they do not appear at all hard-line.
According to the summary of the RMC statements in the
October 24 Washington Post, they stressed representation of
"all social classes and interests" and emphasized economic
development, a mixed economy, and the encouragement of
foreign investment— rather bizarre goals, considering the
bloodshed they had just caused.

Moreover, CAIBhas learned that in 1981 theCIA viewed
Maurice Bishop as an admirer of Fidel Castro who
frequently consulted Cuba's Ambassador to Grenada on
matters of policy. At the same time, according to the CIA,
General Hudson Austin attempted to resign from his Army
post in protest over Cuban influence. Two years later the
positions are supposedly reversed, with General Austin a
Cuban stooge overthrowing and murdering the disen-
chanted Bishop.

More than hypocritical was an alleged discussion between
unnamed U.S. officials and Barbados Prime Minister Tom
Adams of mounting a rescue operation to take Bishop out of
Grenada. Adams is quoted in the October 28 Washington
Post as having said, "Whatever our difference in the past,
Mr. Bishop deserved the support of the Caribbean
governments." Adams had only contempt for Bishop and
was clearly perpetuating the cover for an invasion already
in the works.

The day after the invasion began the hypocrisy was
pointed out by John Goshko of the Washington Post: "This
revisionist view of Bishop as a moderate within the context
of Grenada's internal politics appears to have provided part
of the justification for the United States and six Caribbean
countries to band together in the invasion against what
Reagan yesterday called a 'brutal group of leftist thugs.'"

Pre-Invasion Manipulations

There were plans for a military invasion two years before
it actually occurred, and serious moves toward it many
weeks before Bishop's assassination. A few days before the
invasion, administration officials admitted that the Pentagon
had been "dusting off contingency plans." (Washington
Post, October 23, 1983.) None of the facts, as it happens, is
consistent with the U.S. line that an invasion was not
seriously contemplated until the OECS requested it.

Most telling were the Ranger exercises which came to light
in early November. It was then reported that from
September 23 to October 2, the 2d Battalion of the 75th
Rangers Division, stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington —
one of the two Ranger units which participated in the actual
invasion — spent six days practicing taking over an airport,
complete with parachute jumps onto runways, capturing
airport buildings, taking captives, and liberating hostages.
Although an Army spokesman referred to the exercises as
occurring "regularly" at Ephrata Municipal Airport— which

happened to have a runway the same length as the Point
Salines runway — an airport official told reporters, "It would
be pretty farfetched to say it's done on a regular basis.
They've done it twice to my knowledge — in 1981 and this
time." (Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 3, 1983.) The
1981 exercise can only refer to the CIA plans and military
maneuvers postponed that year by the opposition of the
Senate Intelligence Committee. Moreover, the Pentagon
had requested that the recent practice not be given any
publicity.

This dry run, and the discussions with various Caribbean
officials, all took place before the overthrow of Bishop,
added proof that the Americans knew that events in
Grenada were coming to a head. (As noted above, a
congressional source has said the Pentagon admitted in a
secret briefing that it knew of the coup against Bishop two
weeks in advance.)

The reported "slip of the tongue" of the U.S. Ambassador
to France, Evan Galbraith, is further evidence. He said on
French television on October 26 that the invasion was "an
action which had begun two weeks ago," leading many to
suspect that the administration thought of bringing France
into the plan. When later confronted, Galbraith said that he
had "misspoken," that it would be "ridiculous to suggest"
that the invasion had been planned before the overthrow of
Bishop. (New York Times, November 6, 1983.)

Another interesting report, noted earlier, was in the
October 1983 issue of Caribbean Contact, the newspaper of
the Caribbean Council of Churches, published in Barbados.
An article by editor Ricky Singh discussed at length
opposition charges that the government of Prime Minister
Tom Adams was having a contingent of the fledgling
Barbados Defense Force trained in Washington by the CIA.
Adams did not directly deny the charges, but simply
responded glibly that, "So far as I know, the Central
Intelligence Agency is not a military organization." Errol
Barrow, leader of the opposition, countered this with a
caustic reference to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the
Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries. Additionally, a month
before the invasion, Barrow complained that the stockpiling
of medical supplies suggested ominous preparations for war.
In a move which only gave more credence to the reports,
Singh, a Guyanese exile, was told by the Adams government
on November 1 that his work permit was revoked
"immediately" and that he had to leave Barbados, unless he
recanted his outspoken opposition to the U.S. invasion.

The Imminent Invasion

As the time for the invasion approached, pressures from
the U.S. intensified to the point that Caribbean leaders who
were opposed to it, such as Trinidad and Tobago Prime
Minister George Chambers and Guyana Prime Minister
Forbes Burnham, were being excluded from meetings and
kept misinformed. Ironically, Chambers, a conservative, is
facing criticism from his even more conservative rivals for
failing to support the invasion, and there is talk of U.S.
economic retaliation, including the threatened removal of
U.S. oil refineries.

State Department spokesmen, such as Deputy Assistant
Secretary James H. Michel at an October 28 briefing, insisted
that the decision to invade was made by the OECS, who
"came to us." But the suggestion is fatuous. Reported
incidents clarify who was calling the shots.

The urgency of timing was underscored when Deputy

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Covert Action 13

Assistant Secretary of State Charles Gillespie (now
"Ambassador" to Grenada) surfaced in Barbados at
meetings between OECS leaders and Prime Minister Seaga
of Jamaica and Adams of Barbados — meetings at which
those countries allegedly decided to ask for U.S. aid. The
Washington Post noted that Gillespie was in Barbados "on a
previously scheduled visit" when the regional talks turned to
the discussion of invasion. The "previously" scheduled visit,
according to Newsda\\ was "a trip to the region with Vice
President George Bush on the weekend of October 1 5, "just
after Bishop was placed under house arrest, and the same
time that Adams said "a U.S. official" approached him with
the idea of a "rescue" mission for Bishop.

The U.S. line surely strains credulity. Ironically, as the
Post also reported, even as these top level officals were later
pressuring and dictating to their Caribbean allies, "diplo-
matic efforts by Caribbean nations were under way that were
aimed at lifting the island's curfew and allowing planes to
come in and evacuate anyone who wanted to leave." These
efforts did not square with the U.S. scenario, of course.

Yet spokesman Michel, with little regard for his
credibility, reiterated, "I will say to you categorically, we did
not propose action to the Eastern Caribbean nations. They
proposed it to us." Such is the spineless nature of the
Washington media that although not a single journalist
believed this, no one would call Michel a liar.

Stage Managing the Invasion

The almost unbelievably strict press censorship imposed

U.S. Ranger surveys mental hospital rubble. After perfunctory
search for bodies. Pentagon ordered entire building demolished.

by the U.S. for the first several days of the invasion was
clever on two accounts. As could be expected, it prevented
anyone from confirming or refuting whatever official
statements issued forth from the Pentagon, the State
Department, and the White House, many of which, it later
transpired, were outright lies. But it also deflected media
scrutiny by making the censorship as big a story for the
media as the invasion. Half the precious minutes on the
nightly TV news programs were devoted to the adventures of
small bands of correspondents trying by air and water to
break the blockade. Media pundits waxed self-righteous
over the Pentagon spokesman's gaffe that "we learned a
lesson from the British in the Falklands," where independent
reporters were kept completely away from the operation.

What is so disturbing is that despite the blustering about
censorship, most of the U.S. media accepted supinely e\er\
tidbit they were handed, and rarely concerned themsehes
with what they were not being told. It was a war of images,
and the first images to reach the American public were
controlled by the administration: a gaggle of groveling
medical school students kissing an airport runway, instead
of a mental hospital blasted to smitherines, patients and all.

A few reporters who did get on the island during the
invasion were taken by American forces to the U.S.S.
Guam and held incommunicado for a day to prevent them
from filing stories. After their release, the American
reporters seemed to toe the U.S. line. The London
Observer's Hugh CTShaughnessy told quite a different story.
He found out what the U.S. thought of his presence as he was
flown out a few days later to Barbados and working
telephones. The U.S. public affairs officer remarked, "You
really threw a wrench in the works. We were expecting to
have the story to ourselves. "

The only contemporaneous reporting of the invasion
came from two American ham radio operators on the island,
one a medical school student, Mark B. Barettella, the othera
12-year resident, Don Atkinson. As the newspapers, which
made Barettella a hero and virtually ignored Atkinson,
noted, they "transmitted dramatically different views of the
situation on Grenada." Atkinson was a vocal critic of the
Reagan administration's position and he stressed that the
students had not been in any danger until the U.S. invaded.
During the transmissions, Atkinson's house was strafed in
an apparent attempt to destroy his antenna. Barettella
referred repeatedly to sniper fire near the school campus,
asking that helicopters divert around the school to draw the
fire, and reporting that the students were lying low, waiting
to be rescued. Interestingly, as was noted in the October 28
New York Times, hams monitoring the transmissions
"puzzled . . . over the cryptic, coded responses Mr. Barettella
made about troop movements. " There was no explanation
of this reference to code, but it should be remembered that
Barettella was at the same medical school complex as
Newsweek's "mystery man," the "retired" Foreign Service
officer who had served in Laos.

The Lies

Of course the censorship was not imposed by the adminis-
tration and the military merely to suppress information. It
was also used to peddle lies and half-truths, while they were
complacent in the knowledge that no one on Grenada could
reach the media effectively to expose the nature and extent
of the disinformation. (A good review of much of the
"official misinformation" can be found in Stuart Taylor's full

14 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

page piece on the subject in the November 6 New
York Times.)

The first lies surfaced even before the invasion had begun
and censorship been imposed. When the fleet bound for
Lebanon was diverted after the murder of Bishop, it was
described as a "precautionary move," and as late as the night
before the invasion reporters were told by the President's
press secretary, Larry Speakes, that the fleet was to
"monitor" the situation, that there were "no plans for U.S.
military action in Grenada, "that rumors of an invasion were
"preposterous." Yet the fact of the invasion was hardly a
secret to anyone except the American people. Detailed
rumors were flying at the Caricom and OECS meetings; and
Radio Free Grenada was denouncing an imminent attack.

Official lies about the composition of the attacking force
abounded. Both President Reagan and Eugenia Charles
referred to a "multinational force." But every single soldier
involved in the invasion was American. After the island was
occupied, the other members of the "multinational" force
were flown in and comfortably ensconced in police jobs. As
Hugh O'Shaughnessy pointed out, "It was clear to anyone
on the island however that no Jamaican or Barbadian or St.
Lucian or Antiguan or Dominican or Vincentian, whether in
military uniform or dressed as a policeman, had had any part
in the fighting whatsoever. We saw nothing but U.S.
troops." And, he was told, "Admiral Metcalf commands the
ships, the island, and the aircraft."

The Cubans on Grenada

Some of the most outrageous lies concerned the Cubans
on Grenada. The first was the notion that the Rangers
parachuted into heavy Cuban fire. As the Cuban government
statements published here, and common sense, demonstrate,
the Cubans did not fire upon the descending Rangers. They
had orders not to fire unless attacked. (See sidebar.)

The Cubans were sandbagged twice. Even before the
invasion, they had made it clear to the world in general and
the U.S. Interests Section in particular that they were
appalled by the actions of the Revolutionary Military
Council, and that they did not intend to get involved in
internal Grenadian affairs. They wished to cooperate in
ensuring the safety of U.S. residents on Grenada and, later, in
the return of their own people. The Cuban government had
refused to supply arms or reinforcements to the RMC, but
had determined that it would be dishonorable to evacuate its
citizens just as an invasion was imminent. Cuba even tried to
advise the RMC how to prevent an invasion. They suggested
that the area around the airport and the medical school be
completely demilitarized so that a pretext of danger to the
students would be eliminated, a suggestion which was not
followed, but which shows the falsity of U.S. suggestions
that the Cubans were planning to take students hostage.

The fact is that the Cubans did not even obstruct the
Ranger landings. They were in their barracks at the far end
of the site, assuming they would not be involved in the
subsequent battle. The Rangers did meet some hostile fire
as 350 of them parachuted onto the field from a low 500 feet,
but that was Grenadian anti-aircraft fire. Returning Rangers
who were interviewed by the media spoke only of anti-
aircraft fire, not of any shooting from the Cuban
construction workers at the other end of the field. And, given
the Cubans' position there, it is impossible that, had they
been trying to shoot the descending Rangers, none would
have been hit. Yet, shortly after landing and clearing the

runway for additional troop landings, the Rangers attacked
the Cubans, commencing a day's fierce fighting.

That night the Cubans and the Americans exchanged
diplomatic notes again and the Cubans were assured that
they were "not a target" and that their ultimate evacuation
would not be considered a "surrender." The following
morning, the reassured Cubans remaining in defensive
positions were directly attacked by helicopter gunships.

The Numbers Game

The numbers game played by the U.S. was audacious.
Though the Cuban government had always admitted there
were between seven and eight hundred Cubans on Grenada,
almost all of them construction workers, the U.S. insisted,
even two days after the invasion was launched, that there
were at least 1 , 100 and perhaps 2,000 Cubans on the island,
and that they were all trained soldiers, most of them
"impersonating" construction workers. As late as the 28th,
Vice Admiral Metcalf said that "several hundred Cubans
had escaped into Grenada's hills and could cause problems
for U.S. troops in the coming weeks." ( Washington Post,
October 30, 1983.) He also said that a search party had been
sent to the tiny island of Cariacou, north of Grenada, to hunt
for missing Cubans. None was ever found.

The next day the U.S. admitted that a "closer reading" of
captured documents, which had supposedly led to the high
estimates, actually confirmed the figures released by the
Cuban government. Moreover, they finally admitted that
the construction workers appeared to be construction
workers. Other similar errors were made. During the first
week of the invasion the U.S. said there were 30 Soviet and
an unspecified number of East German military advisers on
the island. None ever materialized.

The President's speech to the nation, while fighting was in
progress, stressed the inflated figures. He spoke of
documents which indicated an immiment influx of thousands
of Cubans. The next day Pentagon officials reiterated this,
noting that 4,341 troops from Cuba were expected. "We got
there just in time," the President said. Later it transpired that
the documents related to a proposed expansion of the
Grenadian army and had nothing to do with Cuba.

The President also referred to warehouses "stacked to the
ceiling" with weapons and ammunition, "enough to supply
thousands of terrorists. "This was typically perverse Reagan
rhetoric. The weapons were sufficient to supply the militia
too, the purpose for which virtually all observers now admit
they were intended. Moreover, as Stuart Taylor noted, "the
warehouses were no more than half-full, and many weapons
were antiquated. "The arms merchant and ex-CIA employee,
Sam Cummings, whose Virginia and Britain-based Inter-
arms operation commands a corner on 90% of all "private"
weapons trade in the world, called the Pentagon's captured
materiel "a very mixed and relatively miserable bag." The
Christian Science Monitor (November 7, 1983) was more
specific: "Administration officials had said there were
enough Cuban arms in Grenada to maintain a 14,000 to
17,000 man expeditionary force. But the U.S. government's
own figures show: 6,323 rifles, 13 antiaircraft guns, 111
machine guns, 78 RPGs (shoulder rocket launchers), and
12 Soviet-made armored personnel carriers." And of the
6,000 rifles, only about 400 to 800 were "reasonably
modern;" the rest were very old, including many "antiques,"
some from the Nineteenth Century.

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Covert Action 15

The Body Counts

The reports of American casualties incurred in the
invasion were total fabrications. Even at CAIB press time,
weeks after the invasion, it is not known how many
Americans died or were wounded. For one thing, the
Pentagon does not count as casualties anyone not killed or
wounded by enemy fire, and now it appears that dozens of
Gls were victims of "friendly fire," U.S. mistakes.

While President Reagan and other officials prided
themselves on the "surgical precision" of the operation, what
really happened was that Americans strafed other
Americans; helicopters crashed into each other; landing
craft overturned and sank. For example, four commandos
drowned in the operation to rescue the Governor General
before they even hit the shore. Early reports said that 6 or 8
Americans were killed in the fighting, a figure later amended
to 18. But the London Guardian of November 10 reported
that at least 42 Americans had died, and some reports
suggested the figure may be as high as 70. And numbers of
Americans wounded are equally inconclusive.

Official figures relating to Cuban deaths and injuries were
also outrageous— inflated, rather than understated. Initial
reports suggested that only Cubans were resisting the
invasion, which was untrue, and the first U.S. figures of
Cubans captured and killed added up to more than all the
Cubans on the island, as Vice Admiral Metcalf learned to his
later embarrassment when he scoffed at Cuban statements
that there were less than 800 Cubans on the island. "That's
patently false," he told reporters. "If you believe that, we've
already killed and captured more people than they have
here." And Metcalf did not make this statement in the heat
of battle, but five days after the invasion.

Grenadian Resistance and Casualties

The greatest inaccuracies, lies, and coverups related to the
Grenadians. From the outset, the U.S. portrayed all the
resistance as Cuban, all the fighting as between Cubans and
Americans. But there was considerable Grenadian resistance I
to the invasion, from the initial antiaircraft fire directed at
the Rangers to the sniper attacks still being reported at press
time. Only four days after the initial assault did Vice
Admiral Metcalf admit that any of the combatants were
Grenadian.

For two weeks the occupying Americans refused to
provide any accounting whatsoever of Grenadian casualties.
Despite reports of large numbers of deaths, of fields of
bodies, of overcrowded hospitals and clinics, of heavy
fighting in many locations, U.S. officials continue to deny
high Grenadian casualties. On November 11 a public
information officer finally chalked up on a blackboard,
under "Grenadian casualties," "21 killed in action, 111
wounded." Reporters rushed to copy down the figures.
Within a few hours the figures had been erased and a new
notice was posted: "No figures at this time." ( Washington
Post, November 12, 1983.) Only two days before, the deputy
commander of the invasion had told reporters that
"roughly" 160 Grenadian soldiers had been killed. But
observers on the scene all indicated that hundreds of
islanders met their deaths in the invasion.

While the Americans were announcing, and displaying,
every single bullet (5,615,682), shotgun (300), and flare
(24,768) allegedly captured on Grenada (United Press
International, November 12, 1983), they professed no idea
how many Grenadians had been killed or wounded. The
excuses given ranged from the ludicrous to the morbid.
Larry Speakes, the President's press secretary, announced
first that it was impossible to tell how many Grenadians had
been killed because they had a religious custom of immediate
burial of the dead. When it was pointed out that most
Grenadians are Roman Catholics, he corrected his account,
admitting the obvious, that although no religious custom
was involved, the dead are buried quickly in tropical
climates. However, he did not explain why no inquiries were
made of priests, funeral directors and cemetery personnel,
who would have had no reason to hide the number of recent
burials.

Vice Admiral Metcalf was more macabre: "1 know the
figure will be higher when we get a final count," he told
journalists. "Why, just this morning we found a field near
here full of bodies. These people have been in that field a
long time, and no one feels particularly good about counting
them." Weeks after the invasion, in fact, Grenadians were
still dealing with the gruesome task of locating, usually by
smell, and burying the bodies which lay all over the island.
The full casualty figures will never be known.

Another short-lived news story concerned the existence of
a "mass grave" on the southern shore of the island, with
some 100 to 200 bodies in it. The initial reports suggested
that perhaps the grave contained people killed in the
massacre at Fort Rupert which led to the death of Bishop.
However, the next day U.S. officials were forced to admit a
"mistake." The State Department was actually holding press
conferences in Washington based on rumors!

It remains unknown how many people did die in thecoup
before the invasion, but it has been suggested by a number of
informed sources that the U.S. may be trying to inflate the

\

He's Also a Man

One of Washington's favorite Reaganauts, US1A
Director Charles Z. Wick (see CAIB Numbers 16 and
19), had a heavy hand in the media coverage of the
invasion of Grenada. Wick was upset by what he called
the "biased" reporting— including the use of the
"pejorative" term "invasion"— so he had his agency, at
taxpayers' expense, prepare a junket for at least ten
Washington-based journalists, mostly Europeans.
They were flown to Grenada and hosted there for four
days by U.S. officials.

It also transpired that the agency had taken at least
12 other journalists on a two-week tour of Central
America just two weeks earlier. Wick, who is never
daunted by overstatement, accused people who used
terms like "invasion" of "putting our society in
jeopardy." He insisted he would continue such trips to
help get the U.S. government's message across.

Wick used a few dangerous words of his own
recently. On December 3, addressing the California
Press Association in San Francisco, when asked why
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not
support the invasion of Grenada, he said, "She's a
great prime minister. She's also a woman." When the
audience groaned. Wick begged, "Please don't print
what 1 just said." •

V s

16 Covert Action

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

number of those killed at Fort Rupert to hide the extent of
deaths from the invasion.

The "Intelligence Failure"

A further lie was the so-called intelligence failure,
discussed in the early aftermath of the invasion. Originally
officials expressed chagrin that the military did not know
there were nearly twice as many Cubans on Grenada as had
been reported by intelligence sources, or that most of them
were trained soldiers, not construction workers. However,
since this information turned out to be false, and the original
estimates correct, it is unclear how this was an intelligence
"failure.'" Moreover, what actually seems to have irked the
Pentagon most was how tenaciously the Grenadians and the
Cubans fought. The -resistance was, as the Canadian
magazine MacLean's put it, "stiffer than expected." One
wonders why it was unexpected, since the Grenadians and the
Cubans had always said they would fight fiercely and to the
death against any Yankee aggression.

An interesting reason for the"confusion" over the number
of Cubans on Grenada emerged in Canadian media,
suggesting that an inflated Cuban presence was a CI A media
disinformation operation planned well before the invasion
which may have misled some Pentagon analysts not in on the
scam. An "authoritative" article on Cubans in Grenada had
been written for the November issue of Naval Institute
Proceedings by Timothy Ashby, described in the Toronto
Globe and Mail (October 29, 1983) as "a visiting scholar at
the Hoover Institute at Stanford University who lived in
Grenada on and off for 1 3 years." In fact, Ashby prepared an
October 26, 1983 preliminary draft report on Grenada for
The Conservative Caucus Research, Analysis & Education
Foundation, Inc., with much the same hysterical misinfor-
mation. An advance copy of the naval magazine article was
provided to Reuters shortly before the invasion, and
described in its wire service dispatches. The article not only
insisted that there were more than 1,000 Cubans on
Grenada, and that more than 300 of them were trained,
full-time military, but also faulted anyone who did not know
this for not keeping their eyes open. Much of the equipment
involved, the author asserted, was on display in a March
1983 parade in Grenada.

The disinformationists were hoist by their own petard.
The article was touted in the media to demonstrate that there
should not have been the intelligence failure which at the
time was thought to have occurred. The irony is that the
invasion provided positive proof that the so-called facts of
the authoritative article were themselves untrue, deliberate
disinformation intended to be part of the ongoing propa-
ganda war against Grenada. The unfortunate author had no
idea that his lies were going to be exposed so quickly.

The highly touted intelligence failure was nothing more
than a smokescreen to hide the fact that a few hundred
Cubans and several hundred Grenadians were fiercely
resisting some 6,000 to 8,000 elite U.S. troops on the island
and more than 10,000 more on ships off the coast.

International Condemnation and Domestic Accolades

Perhaps the biggest lie asserted was the contention that
what the United States was doing was lawful. (See sidebar.)
But the Reagan administration evidently cared nothing for
international law or world opinion. More than a hundred
nations condemned the invasion, including most of the

United States's closest and most important allies, and the
President responded that "it didn't upset my breakfast. "The
British and West Germans were most concerned because of
the impending arrival of U.S. nuclear missiles, over which
they expect some share of control. The curt dismissal of
Prime Minister Thatcher's objections to the invasion led
European allies to wonder about whose finger will be on
the button.

What Reagan really cared about was domestic reaction,
and his carefully staged and managed affair appeared to
have worked, at least in the short run. Hours after the
invasion, street interviewees were saying, "1 hope the
Marines get 'em," without knowing who "'em" was. Polls
showed a rise in the President's popularity and support for
the invasion, all of which stemmed from a steady diet of lies.
As Senator Paul Tsongas (Dem.-Mass.) pointed out, "most
people, once they saw the polls come out, went
underground."

The invasion of Grenada instantly unified Republicans
and divided Democrats, as one pollster observed. This could
hardly have been a coincidence: The President had been in
trouble domestically over the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut, a political problem which almost
evaporated with his invasion of Grenada. Moreover, the
victory of the U.S. media operation has led to further
military maneuvers in the Caribbean and deep fears in
Nicaragua, Cuba, and El Salvador.

Any suggestion of self-determination for the new
Grenadian "government" was quickly dispelled by the clear
relationship of dependence on its U.S. mentors. It was the
Americans, in the person of Ashley Wills aboard the U.S.S.
Guam and Charles Gillespie waiting expectantly in
Barbados, not the Grenadians, who were deciding on the
makeup of the new puppet government. A "cabinet-in-exile"
sat hunched over shortwave radios in Barbados as the
fighting raged; the prospective quislings had been brought
there by the U.S. and were staying in blocks of
condominiums rented by the U.S. Embassy there.

Perhaps the only idea the Americans got from a
Grenadian was how to characterize the invasion. Associated
Press stringer, Grenadian Alister Hughes, a constant critic
of the Bishop government, said on television, "Thank God
for the Americans. I don't regard it as an invasion. I regard it
as a rescue operation." Several days later. President Reagan,
who had himself called the operation an invasion, chided
reporters at a press conference: "Incidentally, 1 know your
frequent use of the word invasion; this was a rescue mission."

The "Liberators"

Virtually all the media have given extensive coverage to
the apparent relief with which many Grenadians greeted the
invaders. But as a London Sunday Times writer noted, in
1969 the Catholics in Northern Ireland welcomed the British
soldiers into Londonderry, seeing them as protectors against
Protestant violence. Former Grenadian U.N. Ambassador
Kenrick Radix said that after the coup, the massacre at Fort
Rupert, and the murder of Bishop and his supporters, the
people would have welcomed the Devil himself. The
Washington Times, an organ of Reverend Sun Myung
Moon's Unification Church, ran a shockingly insensitive
front-page interview with Maurice Bishop's mother and
Jacqueline Creft's parents, obviously overjoyed at the U.S.
overthrow of the RMC. But to infer that they therefore

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Covert Action 17

supported Ronald Reagan and gunboat intervention is
completely unjustified. The Washington Times, incidentally,

had its reporters and photographer included in the first
Pentagon-sponsored flights to Grenada, bumping more

International Law and the Invasion

Until public opinion jelled favorably for the President,
at least temporarily, it was important for the administra-
tion to insist that its actions had some validity under
international law. Although the United Nations Charter
and the Charter of the Organization of American States
flatly prohibit armed intervention against another state,
self-defense is a recognized exception to the prohibitions
on the use of force. The initial U.S. position— which
waffled considerably— was that Grenada's neighbors
feared an imminent invasion by Grenada, a rationale
which now seems fatuous, or that Grenada, in the person
of the Governor General, had joined in a unanimous
request by the OECS members for intervention to help
him restore order. The latter assertion is untrue, since the
Governor General has admitted that he did not send such
a request until after the invasion was already in its final
countdown (and in any event the message was not
received). The U.S. was forced to argue next that the
Revolutionary Military Council was not a government,
even though they had been negotiating with it over the
safety of the students, and that there was no government
on Grenada except the Governor General, who wanted an
invasion, even if he couldn't get a message out to that
effect.

This argument is somewhat dampened by the fact that
the Governor General is a representative of the Queen of
England, whose government opposed the invasion. Nor is
there any British constitutional precedent for this line.
Moreover, the OECS treaty referred to threats from
outside the region, and it required unanimous consent for
intervention. No matter who or what was the government
of Grenada, neither St. Kitts-Nevis nor Montserrat
approved of the invasion. Further, despite what the
OECS treaty might have allowed, the United States, and
Grenada for that matter, both subscribed to the U.N.
Charter and the OAS Charter, both of which absolutely
prohibit armed intervention.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., no dove, argued eloquently in
the Wall Street Journal (November 9, 1983) that the
"sneak attack" was alien to U.S. heritage and tradition.
He destroyed each of the justifications given by the
administration: As for the students, "there was no
evidence that these students were in danger or were
detained against their will." On the necessity to avert
chaos: "No evidence had been submitted that there was
chaos in Grenada," beyond the killings of some officials
by other officials. As for the contention that the request
had come from the OECS states, he noted that " 'the
formal request,' according to the New York Times, 'was
drafted in Washington and conveyed to the Caribbean
leaders by special American emissaries.' " With regard to
the assertion that intervention was necessary to "restore
order and democracy in Grenada," he remarked that this
"would have a little more plausibility if we showed an
equal determination to restore order and democracy in,

say, Haiti or Chile."

The legal scholars differed, to say the least, but it
appears that only a few of the most reactionary could find
support for the President's actions. Some "justifications"
were ludicrous. Professor Anthony D'Amato of North-
western, in a letter to the New York Times, posited a
doctrine of "constructive invitation." "If Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop had survived the attack on his life, he
might well have invited the United States into Grenada to

protect him against the coup by Gen. Hudson Austin

Should the fact that Austin succeeded in murdering
Bishop erase an invitation that otherwise surely would
have been extended?"

This errant claptrap was attacked in a followup letter to
the Times from Professor Josef Silverstcin of Rutgers. He
pointed out that the suggestion could only be valid, if
then, had there been no government whatsoever after
the coup. But, he noted, there was a ruling RMC with
which the United States was talking and negotiating.
What is more, the notion that Maurice Bishop ever would
have welcomed, much less called for, a U.S. invasion of
Grenada is an insult to his memory.

Other scholars, such as Professor Burns Weston of the
University of Iowa, have dismissed the administration's
alleged concern for the human rights of the Grenadians as
"laughable," considering the governments which it
supports, like El Salvador. And it is difficult to quibble
with the language of the OAS Charter (Article 17) that
no state can occupy another's territory "even temporarily
... on any grounds whatsoever."

An interesting legal sidelight was exposed in the
November 6 London Sunday Telegraph, which dis-
covered that 27 U.S. military policemen had sworn an
oath of allegiance to Queen Elizabeth 11 in order to serve
under the Grenada Police Commissioner and thus have
legal authority to arrest and detain Grenadians. The M Ps
evidently found it humorous, telling reporters it was "no
big deal." "We have a father in America— Ronnie
Reagan," one of them said, "and now we have a mother in
England."

It also transpired that even during the invasion and its
aftermath the U.S. violated international law regarding
both the law of war and the treatment of prisoners.
During the initial fighting at the airport, the Rangers had
advanced on a Cuban position using some captured
Cubans as human shields, a blatant violation of
international law. The bombing of the mental hospital
and obvious civilian sites, assertedly errors, also suggest
violations. And, as front page pictures in the U.S. media
attested, key Grenadian prisoners such as Austin and
the Coards were shackled and blindfolded as they were
transferred from the Guam to Richmond Hill prison, a
violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the
treatment of prisoners of war.

18 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

experienced reporters from established newspapers. This
more than suggested U.S. government cooperation in
getting to Mrs. Bishop and the Crefts. (See also "Pak in the
Saddle" article.)

Another major media manipulation involves the slow
release of "captured"documents, some 6,000 pounds worth,
according to U.S. officials, although only five pounds had
been released at press time. It will be almost impossible to
know for sure whether each document is genuine or altered
or forged, although the few already released do not, on close
reading, support the broad and sweeping generalizations
which the government says they prove. Many documents
released by the State Department to prove "communist
interference in El Salvador" turned out to be forgeries, and
the others did not say what they were alleged to say, or
demonstrate the "facts" the government said they proved.

Psychological Operations

Already U.S. imperialism, aided by American intelligence
agencies, is commencing a mind control operation on
Grenada. Symbols of the New Jewel Movement and of the
Revolution have been bombed out of existence, like Butler
House, Radio Free Grenada, and even Bishop's mother's
house (which the State Department said was hit by accident,
like the mental hospital).

Army PSYOPS (psychological operations) teams are
hard at work, with the CIA, interrogating everyone on the
island, not merely to discover members of the Peoples
Revolutionary Army or the Revolutionary Military Council,
but all of Bishop's supporters as well. The PSYOPS people
are caught in a contradiction, however. Recognizing the
respect and love the vast majority of the Grenadian people
had for Bishop, they must give lip service to his memory at
the same time they attempt to eradicate anything connected
to his programs.

The suggestion that Bishop supporters have not been as
suspect as anyone else in what remained of the Grenada
government is belied by the massive witchhunt that went
into effect immediately after the invasion. Hundreds of
Grenadians— including Kenrick Radix, who had been jailed
by the RMC for leading a pro-Bishop demonstration — were
being rounded up by U.S. forces and interrogated if
"suspected or accused of sympathizing or having had ties
with the government of slain prime minister Maurice Bishop
or the short-lived military council that replaced him."
(Washington Post, November 13, 1983.) Soldiers at
roadblocks and at the airports carry notebooks filled with
long lists of such alleged sympathizers. Assisting the U.S.
troops in the roadblocks and in house to house searching,
according to the London Guardian (November 5, 1983), are
former members of Eric Gairy's notorious Mongoose Gang,
who were released from prison by the invaders, and who
have an obvious axe to grind with anyone connected wit h the
Bishop government.

The PSYOPS teams have been very heavy-handed. They
are operating a radio station on the old RFG frequency,
called Spice Island Radio, which alternates pure propaganda
with American rock and roll. Col. Jim Ashworth, the
PSYOPS commander, told the New York Times they would
turn over the operation when Grenadians are "ready to
resume operating the station."

The PSYOPS teams are also plastering the island with
posters and bulletin boards from which many islanders get
their only local news. Posters show Bernard Coard and

Bishop's law partner, Kenrick Radix, firm supporter to the end.

Hudson Austin in custody, in various states of undress,
above text which reads, "These criminals attempted to sell
Grenada out to the communists. Now they have surrendered.
The Grenadian people will never again allow such characters
to assume power and cause such hardship. Support
democracy in Grenada."

CIA interrogations are sweeping, almost unrelated to
realities in Grenada, or to any security needs. Reglna Fuchs,
a West German nurse who had been working at a clinic in
Grenada for a year and a half, told the Washington Post
(November 21, 1983) that she was kept in Richmond Hill jail
for two days and interrogated relentlessly about whether she
had ever demonstrated against the Vietnam War, whom she
knew when she attended medical school, whether she had
ever met Philip Agee in Germany, and the like. She was
falsely accused of harboring fugitives by two Americans, one
named Ed and the other named Frank Gonzales, who
identified himself to her as CIA.

It remains unclear under what authority the Americans
are rounding up civilians, arresting and interrogating them.
For a time, the U.S. said they were detaining people for their
own safety, which strained belief. They then said that under
international law they had the right to detain combatants
until thecessation of actual hostilities; but they continued to
arrest combatants and non-combatants long after the
shooting was over. Finally they have suggested they are
detaining people upon the orders and authority of Sir Paul
Scoon, the Governor General. Perhaps without grasping the
cruel irony of his words, Sir Paul exclaimed at one point to
reporters, "The Americans have done a bloody good job."
Yet no one really believes that Sir Paul has any power but
what the Americans decide he has. It was, as noted, the U.S.
which brought Grenadian exiles to Barbados for eventual
positions in an "interim government."

Greatly uplifted by it all was the Grenada Democratic
Movement, a small group which had opposed the NJM,
picketing with its motley band every appearance in the U.S.

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Covert Action 19

by a Grenadian official. The president, Francis Alexis, had
been in Barbados for some time; other officials, such as
Keith Mitchell, were on their way to Barbados the day
after the invasion began. Reactions of some well known
Grenadians were less than heroic. It was one thing to "tank
Gawd" for the "rescue;" but some, like former Attorney
General Lloyd Noel, have taken to wearing U.S. Army shirts
and calling for a permanent U.S. military base on Grenada.

The real overt power in Grenada seems to be Charles
Anthony Gillespie, the U.S. "Ambassador" (even though
there is no government to which he can present his
credentials and be accredited). The Ross Point Inn Hotel
and Restaurant, which had always been a favorite for U.S.
diplomats visiting Grenada, has been taken over as the
Embassy and now houses the only de facto government on
the island.

Another elusive and powerful figure is Ashley Wills, who
was a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Barbados and
whom Bishop accused in July of being a CIA officer. Wills
has been intimately involved in Eastern Caribbean affairs
for some time (see CA/B Number 10). During the invasion,
Wills was seen by London Guardian reporter Greg
Chamberlain on board the U.S. S. Guam, who described him
as "the political adviser to the U.S. operation." Wills told

E. Ashley Wills, reported to be power behind U.S. presence in
Grenada.

Chamberlain he had been "called away from his 'university
studies' in the U.S. 36 hours before the invasion."

The Airport and the Cubans

One of the more far-reaching ironies of the invasion has
been the near-completed international airport. U.S. officials
have "quietly" dropped their references to the Bishop
government's prospective use of it for military purposes.
Only after the invasion did the U.S. media report the
repeated assurances from British and American contractors
that the airport was designed for civilian use, and only now
are U.S. officials conceding, despite three years' assertions to
the contrary by President Reagan, that the airport is
essential to the Grenadian economy.

But the greater irony is that the invasion has shown that
the airport can indeed be used for military purposes— the
taking off and landing of military aircraft. It could even be
used by the U.S. against Central America.

It is already known that the Pentagon is allowing U.S.
charter companies to join LIAT, formerly the only airline
serving Grenada. One, Arrow Air, is a charter company
licensed by the U.S. to fly between Miami and Havana.
Within three weeks of the invasion it had added Grenada
and Suriname to its territories.

The stories about the Cubans in Grenada apparently will
never let up. Even after the initial fighting was over, "senior
Pentagon officials" were saying that the very existence of
Cuba made it unlikely that the security of Grenada could be
left to a Caribbean constabulary, even though that was the
theory announced at the time of the invasion. And, if all the
Cubans on Grenada were gone, how could "the Cubans"
pose a problem? Indeed the rush to rid the island of Cubans
led to the shipment of 42 bodies to Cuba, at least 1 2 of which
were obviously not Cuban, dressed as they were in PRA
uniforms.

One of the most ludicrous rumors was taken quite
seriously by the U.S. press— a State Department assertion
that intelligence reports emanating from Cuba contained
"death threats" against Americans "in retaliation for the
invasion of Grenada." (New York Times, November 2,
1 983.) No evidence of any threats was ever produced, and the
reports ceased to appear, though they indicate the depths to
which anti-Cuban propaganda will stoop.

The Implications

Clearly, one of the most significant implications of the
invasion of Grenada has been a dangerous flexing of U.S.
military muscle in the region. New Caribbean naval
maneuvers were ordered within days of the invasion and
reports of the military's heightened role in U.S. foreign
policy were rife.

Directly threatened by such saber-rattling are Nicaragua,
Cuba, and El Salvador. Any talk of the "impossibility" of a
U.S. invasion of Nicaragua has been mooted by the fate of
Grenada. Nicaragua is feverishly preparing for just such an
invasion — and even before the attack on Grenada, contra
activity had escalated dramatically (as described elsewhere
in this issue). The U.S. -sponsored war against Nicaragua has
increased both qualitatively and quantitatively in recent
months. Nicaragua is arming all of its people and creating a
nation-wide militia to prevent a repeat of Grenada. But it is
clear the situation there is not parallel to that in Grenada.
There are no splits within the revolutionary leadership,
which functions far more collectively than any other socialist
government. There is a universal recognition that the best
defense is an armed population. And there is both
widespread support for the government and widespread
disgust for the U.S. policy of arming and supporting the
Somocistas.

In Cuba, the fear of attack is also real; on Grenada, for the
first time, U.S. troops engaged in combat with Cubans. Ever
since Reagan came to power Cuba has been bolstering and
reinforcing its militia, a policy which has been accelerated.
One can only hope that the U.S. will study the mathematics
of the situation before acting. If it took 8,000 or more trained
troops to vanquish several hundred Cubans and Grenadians,
it would take many more combat soldiers than the U.S. has
in the world to defeat the Cubans or the Nicaraguans. •

20 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Cuban Statements on Grenada

STATEMENT OF THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA CONCERNING THE EVENTS
IN GRENADA

It has now become clearly evident that a deep conflict had been evolving
within the leadershipand the Grenada ruling Party for some weeks, perhaps
even months

When Maurice Bishop, main leader of the Party and Prime Minister of
Grenada, made a brief stop-over of some 36 hours in Cuba, from Thursday
evening, October 6, to Saturday morning, October 8 — after an official visit to
Hungary and Czechoslovakia— in his talks with comrade Fidel and other
Cuban leaders, he did not make the slightest reference to the serious discus-
sions and differences taking place within the New Jewel Movement, the
name under which the ruling party of his country is known, thereby evidenc-
ing great dignity and respect for his Party and Cuba. All the topics of the
talks dealt with Cuban cooperation with Grenada and cooperation efforts of
the Grenadian delegation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, whose results
had fully pleased him, as well as other international issues.

On Friday, October 7, Fidel accompanied Bishop on a tour of important
facilities under construction in Cienfuegos, and showed him the progress in
our development projects and the excellent attitude of our workers, with
whom they both talked at length.

A few days later— on Wednesday, October 1 2— our Embassy in Grenada
reported the shocking and distressing news that deep divisions had taken
place within the Central Committee of the Party in Grenada. That same
morning. Bishop himself informed the Embassy of the long-standing differ-
ences that were being discussed and of the attempts at settling them, but that
he had never imagined how serious they would become during his absence.
He simply stated the differences, but did not ask for any opinion or assistance
from us in trying to resolve them, once again evidencing his great respect for
Cuba's international policy and the internal affairs of his own Party.

In the afternoon, it was learned that Bishops opponents had gained a
majority within the Central Committee of the Party, as well as in the political
apparatus of the Army and the Security forces, and that Bishop had been
removed from his position in the Party and placed under house arrest.

As this was purely an internal problem, the Party and the Government of
Cuba, notwithstanding our friendship with Bishop and our confidence in his
integrity and ability as a leader, and strictly abiding by the principle and
norms of Cuba's international policy, instructed our representatives in
Grenada to refrain totally from interfering in the internal affairs of the Party
and of Grenada.

In the days that followed, news of the positions and arguments of the two
parties involved in the conflict kept pouring in through our Embassy. In our
view, it was actually a matter of conflicting personalities and conceptions on
leadership methods— not exempt from other subjective factors — rather than
substantial conflicts.

On Saturday, October 15, comrade Fidel sent a message to the Central
Committee of the New Jewel Movement, clearly stating the position of
Cuba, guided by the principle of fully refraining from interfering in the
internal affairs of the Party and of the nation. At the same time, he expressed
his deep concern over the division that had emerged, which might consider-
ably damage the image of the Grenadian revolutionary process both domes-
tically and abroad; that in Cuba itself, where Bishop enjoyed high esteem, it
would not be easy to explain the events, and that he hoped that the difficulties
could be overcome with utmost wisdom, serenity, loyalty to principles
and generosity.

Cuba's concern was essentially focused on preventing events from reach-
ing a state of violent and bloody confrontation.

In that message, it was also stated that Cuba's cooperation would be
continued as a commitment with the people of Grenada, regardless of any

changes that might take place in the leadership of the Party and in the
country, since this was a purely internal matter.

For a few more days, the situation remained at a standstill. At times, it
seemed that an honorable, intelligent and peaceful solution would be
reached. It was evident that the people backed Bishop and demanded
his presence.

The Western press fabricated all sorts of speculations around the events.
We did not utter a word, in order to avoid our public pronouncements from
being misrepresented as interference in the internal affairs of Grenada, due to
the very close, wide-ranging, and fraternal relations with that sister nation. In
so doing, we had rigorously abided by our principles of respect for the
internal affairs of fraternal parties and countries

Yesterday morning, October 19, the news reported that the workers had
gone on strike and that the poeple had taken to the streets in support of
Bishop. In a mass demonstration, they reached his residence, where they
released him from house arrest. It is claimed— reports are still inaccurate—
that the people took over a military installation. The Army sent troops to
that area. It is said that the Army fired on the demonstrators and inflicted
casualties to them; that it recaptured the installation and arrested many
people. There was no news about the fate of Bishop and the other leaders that
were with him.

The tragic outcome was learned in the afternoon. An official commu-
nique reported the death of Maurice Bishop, Prime Minister; Unison
Whiteman. M inister of Foreign Affairs; Jacqueline Creft, M inister of Educa-
tion; Vincent Noel, First Deputy Chairman of the Grenada Trade Union
Congress; Norris Bain, Minister of Housing; and Fitzroy Bain, Secretary
General of the Agricultural Workers Union. It has not yet been accurately
determined how Bishop and the other leaders died.

Bishop was one of the political leaders who enjoyed greatest esteem and
respect on the part of our people due to his talent, modesty, sincerity,
revolutionary honesty and proven friendship for our country. He also com-
manded great international prestige. The news of his death shocked our
Party leadership and we pay heart-felt tribute to his memory.

Unfortunately, the divisions between the Grenadian revolutionaries have
ended up in this bloody tragedy.

No doctrine, principle or position proclaimed as revolutionary nor any
internal division can justify such brutal procedures as the physical elimination
of Bishop and of the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who
died yesterday.

The death of Bishop and his comrades must be clarified; and had they
been executed in cold blood, those responsible for it deserve exemplary
punishment.

Imperialism will now try to profit from this tragedy and from the serious
mistakes made by the Grenadian revolutionaries, in order to stamp out the
revolutionary process in Grenada, and once again subject that nation to
imperialist and neo-colonial domination.

The situation is extremely difficult and complex. Only a miracle of
common sense, equanimity and wisdom on the part of Grenadian revolu-
tionaries, and of serenity in the reactions and actions of the international
progressive movement may yet save the process.

No step should be taken that may help further the designs of
imperialism.

In Grenada, there are many Cuban doctors, teachers, technicians in
various fields, and hundreds of construction workers giving their assistance
to the people in the provision of basic services and in the development of
vital works for Grenadian economy.

Though deeply embittered by these events, we shall not hasten to take
any steps regarding technical and economic cooperation, which may jeo-
pardize the basic services and vital economic interests of the people of
Grenada, whom we sincerely and deeply admire and love.

After yesterday's tragic outcome, we shall closely follow the course of
events; we shall strictly abide by the principle of non-interference in the
internal affairs of Grenada and shall, above all, take into account the

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 21

interest of the Grenadian people concerning economic and technical coop-
eration, were it possible in the new situation, but our political relations
with the new Grenadian leadership must be subjected to a serious and
profound analysis.

However, if the Grenadian revolutionary process is preserved, we shall
do our best to assist it.

Let us hope that these painful events will lead all the revolutionaries of
Grenada and of the world to profound reflection, and that the concept that
no crime can be committed in the name of revolution and liberty
will prevail.

October 20, 1983

STATEMENT BY THE CUBAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ON
THE IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION IN GRENADA

The painful internal developments in Grenada that brought about the
death of comrade Bishop and other Grenadian leaders, are well known by
all the people.

In its statement of October 20. the Cuban Government explained in
detail the unfolding of events and stated our country's unequivocal and
honorable position regarding these developments while cautioning that
imperialism would try to derive utmost benefit from this tragedy.

But. above all, it stressed the rigorous policy of Cuba of totally refrain-
ing from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of the Grenadian
Party and people.

The merits of such a policy of principles can be noted now more than
ever, since it has become evident that the Cuban personnel in Grenada had
the combat capability with which they could have attempted to influence
the course of internal events. The weapons in the hands of the Cuban
construction personnel and cooperation workers in Grenada had been
given to them by Bishop and the Grenadian Party and Government leader-
ship so that they could defend themselves in the event of a foreign aggression
against Grenada, as has unfortunately been the case. These were mainly
light infantry weapons. Our own personnel kept custody over those wea-
pons in their living quarters. They were not meant to be used in any
domestic conflict and they were never, and will never be used for those ends.
Neither had any type of fortification work been undertaken since it was
illogical to do so in times of peace, at the site of a purely civilian airport.
And another thing: When the invasion of Grenada took place, the weapons
in Cuban hands had less than one ammunition module per rifle.

After Bishop's death and Cuba's statements, relations between our
Party and the new Grenadian leadership were very cold and somewhat
strained. But under no circumstances were we willing to play into the hands
of imperialism, foresaking the Grenadian people by stopping our coopera-
tion and halting the work of our construction crews, doctors, teachers and
other specialists. We did not even immediately recall our military and
security advisors.

Future relations with the new leadership would be determined by its
conduct, its domestic and foreign policy, and by the hope that the revolu-
tionary process could be saved, even though this appeared to be possible
only through a miracle of wisdom and serenity on the part of the Grenadians
themselves and of the international progressive movement.

Relations with the new Government were yet to bedefined. But notwith-
standing the aforementioned reasons regarding our cooperation with the
people of Grenada, from the moment the news of a powerful U.S. naval
force advancing on Grenada was made public it became morally impossible
to consider the evacuation of Cuban personnel in that country.

On the other hand, the new Grenadian leadership, faced with the immi-
nent danger of an invasion and invoking their homeland's security, request-
ed our cooperation, an appeal to which it was not easy to accede in view of
the events that had taken place in that country.

Numerous messages regarding these matters were exchanged between
Cuba and our representatives in Grenada, who conveyed the
Grenadian requests.

Due to the imminence of the aggression, during the afternoon of Satur-
day, October 22. comrade Fidel sent the following message* to the Cuban
representatives in Grenada:

"I believe that organizing our personnel's immediate evacuation at a

time when U.S. warships are approaching might be highly demoralizing

and dishonorable for our country in the eyes of the world

public opinion.

"A large-scale Yankee aggression against us can take place at any
moment in Grenada against our cooperation workers; in Nicaragua
against our doctors, teachers, technicians, construction workers, etc.; in
Angola against our troops, civilian personnel and others, or even in

Cuba itself. We must always be ready and keep our morale high in the
face of these painful possibilities.

"I understand how bitter it is for you, as well as for us here, to risk
compatriots in Grenada, after the gross mistakes the Grenadian Partj
has made and the tragic developments to which they gave rise. But our
position has been unequivocally and honorably clarified, so much so
that it has been received with great respect everywhere. It is not the new
Grenadian Government we must think of now, but of Cuba, its honor,
its people, its fighting morale.

"I believe that in the face of this new situation, we must strengthen
our defenses, keeping in mind the possibility of a surprise attack by the
Yankees. The existing danger fully justifies our doing so. If the United
States intervenes, we must vigorously defend ourselves as if we were in
Cuba, in our camp sites, in our work places close by, but only if we are
directly attacked. I repeat: only if we are directly attacked. We would
thus be defending ourselves, not the Government or its deeds. If the
Yankees land on the runway section near the University or on its
surroundings to evacuate their citizens, fully refrain from interfering.

"Advisors from the Armv and the Ministry of the lnteriorare to stay
in their posts^awaiting new orders, so as to receive information and tr\ lo
exert as much positive influence as possible on the behav ior of the Army
and the Security forces towards the people.

"The Viet Sam Heroico vessel is to be kept there by all means, and
efforts should be made to put children and people who are not essential
to indispensable services and work there on the first plane that lands on
the island.

"Convey to Austin and Layne the following oral reply to
their proposals:

"That our force, essentially made up of civilian cooperation workers,
is too small to be considered as a significant military factor vis-a-vis a
large-scale U.S. invasion.

"That sending reinforcements is impossible and unthinkable.

"That the political situation created inside the country due to the
people's estrangement on account of the death of Bishop and other
leaders, isolation from the outside world, etc. considerably weaken the
country's defense capabilities, a logical consequence derived from the
serious errors made by Grenadian revolutionaries. That due to the above
situation, the present military and political conditions are the worst for
organizing a firm and efficient resistance against the invaders, an action
which is practically impossible without the people's participation. That
they have to find a way to reach a reconciliation with the people, perhaps
one way would be to clarify the death of Bishop and the other leaders
and seek out those responsible.

"That the Grenadian Government may try to prevent affording a
pretext for intervention by publicly offering and reiterating total guar-
antees and facilities for the security and evacuation of U.S., English and
other nationals.

"That if, however, the invasion were to take place anyway, it is their
duty to die fighting, no matter how difficult and disadvantageous the
circumstances may be.

"That the Cuban personnel have been instructed to remain in their
camps and to continue the works of the airport. That they are to adopt
defensive measures and fortify their positions as much as possible in
order to be prepared in case of a surprise foreign aggression. That you
are to be in constant communication with our Party's leadership, and
should an imperialist attack take place, you will receive instructions
regarding what you should do.

"That, in these circumstances, they should keep utmost equanimity
and restraint, if they wish to preserve the Grenadian revolutionary
process' opportunity to survive.

"That Cuba will do its best to promote, together with all progressive
countries, a strong campaign to counter the U.S. threats against
Grenada."

At 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 22, we sent the following message to
the Government of the United States through its Interests Section:

"That the U.S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada; that it
is also aware of our position on these developmentsand of ourdetermi-
nation of not interfering in the internal affairs of that country. That we
are aware of their concern about the numerous U.S. residents there.
That we are also concerned about the hundreds of Cuban cooperation
personnel working there in different fields and about the news that U.S.
naval forces are approaching Grenada.

"That according to the reports we have, no U.S. or foreign nationals,
nor our personnel has had any problems. It is convenient to keep in
touch on this matter, so as to contribute to solve favorably any difficulty
that may arise or action that may be taken relating to the security of
these indiviudals, without violence or intervention in the country."
Once the agreements adopted by a group of Yankee satellites in the
Caribbean area to dispatch troops to Grenada became known, the new

22 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

leadership in that country renewed its requests for the sending of reinforce-
ments by Cuba. On Sunday, October 23, comrade Fidel sent the following
message to the Cuban representatives in Grenada:

"Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade
Grenada. If this were to occur, it is a mere pretext by the Yankees for
their immediate intervention afterwards. In this case you should strictly
abide by the instructions received yesterday.

"Convey the following answer orally to the Grenadian leadership:
"That Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade
Grenada, and in that case they should defeat them with their own forces
without greater difficulties.

"That behind this intervention, were it actually to take place, there
might be a pretext for the Yankees to act directly; in that case, the
Grenadian revolutionaries should try to win over the people for the
defense of the country, be ready to fight until the very last man and
create conditions for a protracted resistance to the invasion and
foreign occupation.

"That Cuba cannot send reinforcements not only because it is mater-
ially impossible in the face of the overwhelming U.S. air and naval
superiority in the area, but also because politically, if this were to be
merely a struggle among Caribbeans, it should not do so in order not to
justify U.S. intervention.

"That, on the other hand, the unfortunate developments in Grenada
render the useless sacrifice entailed by the dispatching of such reinforce-
ments in a struggle against the United States morally impossible before
our people and the world.

"That, as a matter of our country's honor, morality and dignity we
will keep the Cuban personnel there at a time when powerful Yankee
naval forces are approaching Grenada.

"That, if Grenada is invaded by the United States, the Cuban per-
sonnel will defend their positions in their camps and working areas with
all their energy and courage.

"That, due to the limited number of those forces, it is impossible to
assign them any other mission.

"That Grenadian revolutionaries themselves are the only ones
responsible for the creation of this disadvantageous and difficult situa-
tion for the revolutionary process politically and militarily.

"That within the difficult conditions created, the Cuban personnel in
Grenada, shall honorably meet the duties our revolution has assigned to
them under these circumstances.

"That, as regards military advising, they will receive all possible
cooperation in the face of the situation.

"That it is necessary to continue making adequate political and
diplomatic efforts on their part to prevent the intervention without
compromising on any principles or backing down. That, on our part, we
will do our best in this connection."

The Grenadian side continued to insist on plans that in ourjudgment,
were, in some respects, unrealistic and politically unsound. They even
hoped to sign a formal agreement on what each side should do in the
military field, and intended to subordinate the Cuban construction and
cooperation workers to the Grenadian army. On Monday, October 24, the
following principal points were conveyed to the Grenadian leadership:
"That the Cuban personnel will defend their positions, that is, the
runway up to the Hardy Bay filling and the area between Point Salines
and Morne Rouge, in case of a large-scale U.S. invasion.

"That, in the present conditions, our personnel have neither the
means nor forces to undertake any other mission, nor the moral and
international justification to do so in areas outside their work site.

"It is clear to us that were it just a question of evacuating foreign
personnel, there would be no invasion, and presumably under those
circumstances they would find a solution with the parties concerned.
That, due to this, the American University and its premises should be
under the custody of Grenadians if they deem it necessary and conven-
ient (the U.S. University is located at one end of the runway under
construction by the Cubans). Perhaps it would be better if that area were
free of military personnel so that it would not be regarded as a battle
ground which could justify armed actions by imperialism under the
pretext of evacuating its citizens.

"That there is no need for any formal agreement between us.
"That the instructions regarding what the Cuban personnel is to do
in case of war can only be issued by the Government of Cuba."
This message, which should have been delivered at 8 o'clock in the
morning, Tuesday the 25th, did not even reach the hands of its addressees.
The intervention of the United States in Grenada occurred at the break
of day.

The Cuban representatives and personnel strictly followed the instruc-
tions of the Party and Government of Cuba: to fight if they were attacked in
their camps and work areas.

During the early hours of the day, while U.S. troops were landing with
helicopters in the University area, there was.no combat at all with the
Cubans, who had taken strictly defensive positions in the above mentioned
sites. Around 8:00 a.m. local time (7 a.m. Cuban time), U.S. troops ad-
vanced from different directions on the Cuban facilities, and the fighting
began.

At 8:30 (Cuban time) on the 25th— almost three days later— the Gov-
ernment of the United States replied with the following note to the Cuban
message sent on Saturday the 22nd:

"The United States of America Interests Section of the Embassy of
Switzerland presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Rela-
tions of the Republic of Cuba and has the honorto inform the Ministry
that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, acting out of the
grave concern of its members for the anarchy, bloodshed, and callous
disregard for human life of the Island of Grenada, has asked the United
States Government to facilitate armed forces of its member states in the
restoration of security in Grenada. In response to the request, and
taking into due account the need to safeguard the lives of several
hundred United States citizens now in Grenada, the United States
Government has agreed to this request.

"Consequently, armed forces from the member states of the Organi-
zation of Eastern Caribbean States, supported by those of the United
States, Barbados and Jamaica have entered Grenada for the purpose of
restoring order and public safety.

"The United States Government is aware that military and civilian
personnel of the Republic of Cuba are present in Grenada. It has taken
into full account the message on this subject which was delivered on the
night of October 22 from the Ministry of Foreign Relations to the
Acting Chief of the United States Interests Section in Havana. It wishes
to assure the Government of the Republic of Cuba that all efforts are
being and will continue to be made to ensure the safety of these persons
while order is being restored. These personnel will be granted safe
passage from Grenada as soon as conditions permit. The Government of
the United States agrees to the Cuban proposal of October 22 to
maintain contact concerning the safety of the personnel of each side.
The appropriate civilian representatives with the United States Armed
Forces presently in Grenada have been instructed to be in contact with
the Cuban Ambassador in Grenada to ensure that every consideration is
given to the safety of Cuban personnel on the Island and to facilitate the
necessary steps by Grenadian authorities for their prompt evacuation.
The United States Armed Forces will be prepared to assure this evacua-
tion at the earliest possible moment on ships of third countries. Alterna-
tively, should there be a vessel of the Cuban merchant marine— not a
war ship— in Grenadian waters at present that vessel may be authorized
to conduct the evacuation of Cuban personnel.

"In addition, any Cuban views communicated to the Department of
State through the Cuban Interests Section in Washington or through
the United States Interests Section in Havana will be given immediate
attention.

"The Government of the United States calls upon the Government of
the Republic of Cuba, in the interest of the personal safety of all
concerned, to advise its citizens and forces in Grenada to remain calm
and to cooperate fully with the forces of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States and with those of the United States, Jamaica and
Barbados. It asks that they be instructed to avoid any steps which might
exacerbate the delicate situation in Grenada. Above all, the Government
of the United States cautions the Government of the Republic of Cuba
to refrain from sending any new military unit or personnel to Grenada.

"The United States of America Interests Section of the Embassy of
Switzerland avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of
Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba the assurances of its highest
and most distinguished consideration."

When this note from the Government of the United States arrived, one
and a half hours had elapsed since troops from that country started their
attack on Cuban personnel and three hours since they had begun the
landings.

Throughout the whole day today, Tuesday 25, the Cuban people have
been informed in as much detail as possible, on the development of the
fighting and the resolute and heroic resistance of Cuban construction and
cooperation workers, who practically had not even had time to dig trenches
or to fortify their positions in the rocky terrain, in the face of the sea, air and
ground attacks by U.S. elite troops.

The people are familiar with the contents of the message exchanged
between the Commander in Chief and Colonel Tortolo , who is in
command of the Cuban personnel. This chief, who had not yet been in that
country for 24 hours and who was on a work visit, with his actions and
words has written a chapter in ourcontemporary history worthy of Antonio
Maceo.

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 23

At 5 p.m. in the evening, while intense fighting was taking place, the
Government of the United States, through Mr. Ferch, head of the Interests
Section, sent the following message to Cuba:

"The Cuban personnel stationed in Grenada is not a target for the
actions by U.S. troops.

"The United States is ready to cooperate with Cuban authorities in
the evacuation of Cuban personnel to Cuba.

"The United States is aware that armed Cuban personnel do not
have either the weapons or the ammunition stocks needed for a
protracted action, thus maintaining a belligerent position would entail a
useless loss of human life.

"The United States does not wish to present the departure of Cuban
armed personnel as a surrender.

"Lastly it regrets the armed clashes between men from both
countries, and considers that they have occurred due to confusion and
accidents brought about by our men's proximity to the area of
operations of the multinational troops."

At 8:30 p.m., the following reply was handed over to Mr. Ferch to be
conveyed to the Government of the United States:

" 1 . That we did our best to prevent the intervention, and that in our
note dated Saturday we explained that, according to our reports, no
U.S. or foreign citizen was in danger, while at the same time we
expressed our readiness to cooperate so that the problems could be
resolved without violence or intervention.

"2. That the intervention is totally unjustifiable. That we had
absolutely refrained from meddling in the country's internal affairs,
despite our friendship with and sympathies for Bishop.

"3. That the answer to our constructive note delivered on Saturday
22, at 9 p.m., arrived on Tuesday 25, at 8:30 a.m.. when our personnel
and installations at the airport had been under attack by U.S. troops for
one and a half hours.

"4. That we have no soldiers, but actually construction workers and
ci\ llian advisors in Grenada, with the exception of a few tens of military
advisors who were working with the army and the security forces before
Bishop's death. Our personnel had been instructed to fight back only if
attacked, and they were not the first to shoot. Furthermore, they had
been given instructions not to obstruct any action for the evacuation of
US citizens in the area of the runway near the U.S. University. It was
evident that if any attempt was made to occupy Cuban installations,
they would clash with them.

"5. That our personnel has suffered an indeterminate number of
casualties in today's combats.

"6. That the attack by U.S. troops came as a surprise, without any
previous warning.

"7. That although the Cuban personnel that is still in a position to
resist stands at an absolute numerical, technical and military disadvan-
tage, their morale remains high and they are firmly ready to continue
defending themselves, were the attacks to continue.

"8. That if there is a real intention to forestall further bloodshed,
attacks against the Cuban and Grenadian personnel who are still fight-
ing should stop and an honorable way should be sought to put an end to
a battle that far from honors the United States; a battle against small
forces that, though unable to resist the overwhelming military super-
iority of the U.S. forces, even when losing the battle and sacrificing
themselves, could still inflict a costly moral defeat on the United
States— the most powerful country in the world, engaged in a war
against one of the tiniest countries on Earth.

"9. That the head of the Cuban personnel in Grenada has been
instructed to receive any parleyer that might approach him, listen to his
views and convey them to Cuba.

"10. It cannot be ignored that some Grenadian units are also fight-
ing, and that the treatment given to the Cubans should not differ from
the one they are to receive."

During this evening the Cuban construction and cooperation personnel
'were still holding some of their positions in an uneven and difficult struggle
but with high morale and steadfastness. Later into the night there was little
news forthcoming from Grenada and communications were becoming
difficult.

The courageous and heroic Cuban construction and cooperation per-
sonnel have written an unforgettable chapter in the annals of international
solidarity; but in a larger sense, in Grenada they have been waging a battle
for the small countries of the world and for all the peoples of the Third
World in the face of a brutal imperialist aggression. They have also fought
for the American continent and for their own homeland as if there, in
Grenada, they were in the first line of defense of the sovereignty and
integrity of Cuba.

Grenada may become for Yankee imperialists in Latin America and the
Caribbean what the Moncada garrison meant to the Batista tyranny
in Cuba.

Eternal glory to the Cubans who have fallen and to those who have
fought and are still fighting to defend their honor, their principles, their
internationalist work, their homeland, and their own personal lives threat-
ened by the unjustified, treacherous and criminal imperialist attack.

Patria o Muerte.

Venceremos.

Cuba. October 25. 1983

Paranoia?

From the early days of the Grenadian Revolution,
Maurice Bishop warned that the Americans would
invade — with mercenaries or with troops. This was
dismissed in the western media as typical socialist
paranoia. In fact, after Bishop's June meeting with
then National Security Adviser William P. Clark, he
told reporters that he hoped the timing of an invasion
had been "pushed back. ,, But, he insisted, "We do not
think the threat has been entirely removed."

If Clark was at all reassuring, his influence was
clearly minimal. It may have been uncomfortable for
him later to sit in on the meetings of the "Special
Situation Group" of the National Security Council,
chaired by Vice President and former CIA Director
George Bush, and to listen to the warmongering of
Shultz, Bush, and Casey. Clark finally — a few days
before the invasion of Grenada — accepted another
Cabinet post, letting friends know that he was tired of
fighting with Shultz.

Rather remarkably, even after the invasion, U.S.
officials were suggesting that Grenadian fears had been
paranoid. One such Pentagon official, having reviewed
some of the captured documents, told reporters:

If you're predisposed to see a Soviet and Cuban
threat, then you can find evidence of a significant
military buildup in Grenada and carry it one step
further to see the makings of a Soviet-Cuban
puppet state. On the other hand, if you bring a
different bias to the agreements [between
Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union], it's
possible to argue that a paranoid, Marxist
leadership was rushing to improve its armed
forces for fear that Grenada might be invaded
someday."

That this official could label such a fear paranoid
two weeks after the invasion is incredible. His
boundless disingenuousness was evident in his further
comment:

It might not be convincing, but the Russians
could take the United States military assistance
program in El Salvador or Honduras and by just
presenting the raw number of guns and ammuni-
tion make the propaganda argument that the
United States is turning those countries into a
military bastion.

Really! •

24 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Nicaragua Braces for War

By Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

The Sandinista government of Nicaragua recently
instituted sweeping changes in foreign and domestic policy
and offered significant proposals to ease tensions in the
region. All this occurred in the face of serious U.S. threats of
an invasion, an event which most observers agree is not a
question of whether, but of when.

In the past six months, the U.S. has set the stage for such a
military move by its activities in Central America and by the
invasion of Grenada. And having tasted blood in Grenada,
the Pentagon may be thirsting for another battle. There is
terrible irony in a recent remark by the former chief of the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Wayne Smith, that
"Central America now exercises the same influence on
American foreign policy as the full moon does on
werewolves."

The Nicaraguans have made substantial moves to better
relations with the Roman Catholic hierarchy; they have
offered amnesty to thousands of exiled Miskito Indians, and
to all but top Somocista leaders and those who have led the
counterrevolutionary bands, and have released hundreds of
others from jail. They have proposed far-reaching regional
peace treaties; they have relaxed wartime censorship of
newspapers, and announced preliminary election time
schedules. Yet such moves, in virtually every area where the
U.S. has voiced criticisms, have not slowed the evident U.S.
buildup toward an invasion.

One of the first stages in that buildup was the sending of
5.000 American troops to Honduras in the Big Pine 2
military exercises— open-ended maneuvers all along the
border with Nicaragua. These troops have both provided
logistical support for the Honduran armed forces and the
CIA-supported contras and participated directly in actions
against Nicaragua, while helping their hosts attempt to
exterminate their own revolutionary opponents. A second
stage involved the revival of Condeca, the Central American
Defense Council, described in detail below.

With U.S. and regional troops primed throughout Central
America, a number of alternative scenarios are possible. As
we go to press, any one of them might take place. On the one
hand, the contras might lead an invasion, with direct
Honduran and U.S. military support. On the other hand, the
Hondurans, within the Condeca framework, might lead an
attack against Nicaragua, with U.S. and other allied
support. And, finally, there is the possibility that events
might lead to direct U.S. leadership of the invasion. In each
circumstance, though, it is clear that massive U.S.
involvement will become necessary at some point, for
neither the contras nor the Condeca forces could defeat the
Nicaraguans.

There are two other variables to be considered. With any
plan there is the possibility that events might require a prior
military move in El Salvador, a concerted move by the
Condeca forces to try to defeat the FMLN, who are
consolidating their victories in province after province. The
Salvadoran regime's position becomes more precarious
every day. Further, each possibility is subject to the
strictures of the U.S. presidential election campaign. They
will probably occur either before the campaign is in full
swing, or after the election, but not very likely during the
height of the campaign itself. However, if — as some sources
say— Reagan is reluctant to run again, he might well be less
hesitant to start a war which would surely continue well
beyond the campaign and the election.

The Scenarios

A contra invasion probably would entail a beachhead on
the Atlantic Coast and the creation of a "provisional
government"— which would rapidly receive U.S. recognition
and support. There are enough contra bases in Zelaya Norte,
albeit temporary and constantly on the move, that it could
be made to appear that a portion of the population
welcomed the invasion. As in Grenada, many opponents of
such a move would be silent through fear.

Then Condeca forces could be rushed in to defend such a
provisional government, a move already approved in the
second "new" Condeca meeting held in Tegucigalpa on
October 23 and 24. U.S. troops, under cover of Big Pine 2,
would provide support and direction, and intervene if
necessary. All of the contra groups have been invited to be a
part of such a provisional government, and their greater
unity has been urged by U.S. officials, including special
envoy Richard Stone, who met with contra leaders in
Panama in December. Even coy Eden Pastora seems primed
for this move. After some intricate maneuvering, during
which he claimed that his partner, Alfonso Robelo, was
trying to kill him, they traveled together to the U.S. to raise
funds and gather support. Pastora disingenuously denounced
the U.S. invasion of Grenada, counseled unconvincingly
against invasion of Nicaragua, but was nevertheless hooted
and jeered at most campus appearances.

The possibility remains very real that Condeca forces
might lead an invasion of Nicaragua in their own right, and
not under cover of supporting the contras. Honduras
especially has been extraordinarily provocative in its
rhetoric, and there are rumblings within Condeca. An
indication of the depth and seriousness of the planning is
clear in the sacking of Panamanian Vice President Jorge
Illueca. The National Guard forced his ouster for his harsh

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 25

criticism of Condeca, when he denounced the alliance as a
creation of Anastasio Somoza and said that Panama was
"not in Condeca playing the game against Nicaragua." His
abrupt dismissal suggests that he may not be entirely correct,
and maneuvers leading to a joint action against Nicaragua,
perhaps over some trumped-up incident or provocation,
may be already in progress.

It is least likely that the U.S. would simply invade
Nicaragua, a la Grenada. This is partly for reasons of
garnering international support and partly because the U.S.
might recognize it could not do it alone. Even with allied
support, though, it is clear that the war, which is inevitable,
will be long, bloody, and very costly. It is unlikely that the
U.S. wants to bear the brunt of such a conflict alone. With
this pessimistic but starkly realistic preface, we review the
incidents of the past several months.

The Deepening U.S. Involvement

Starting in the beginning of September, the Reagan
administration's war against Nicaragua moved to a new
stage. There was an upsurge in all forms of activity, from the
level of propaganda to the level of direct U.S. involvement in
the attacks. Larger, bolder, and more sophisticated
operations were launched, by air, land, and sea, and,
according to CBS, U.S. military personnel took part in some
of the raids, driving the speedboats used to attack the
petroleum depot at Puerto Corinto in mid-October.

The controlling hand of the CIA has been openly revealed,
as one by one the administration's phoney rationales are
exposed. Reagan's people never really believed there was a
massive flow of arms from Nicaragua to the FMLN in El
Salvador; they were just desperate to overthrow the
Sandinistas. Unfortunately, public opinion in the United
States is divided, partly because of the propaganda and
partly because people have become inured to covert
intervention as a result of clever media manipulation by the
likes of Time and Newsweek. Long-standing concepts of
international law and of morality have been stood on their
heads. It is one thing for a Neanderthal-like Ernest W.
Lefever to argue that "deceptive, deadly covert actions are
moral:" it is another thing for the Washington Post to give
him half a page to make the argument.

Over a year ago stories abounded describing the $19
million allocated to secret paramilitary operations against
Nicaragua. Most critics, including CAIB, asserted that this
figure represented only the tip of the iceberg and recently
revealed figures bear this out. According to Philip Taubman
of the New York Times, more than $50 million was spent in
each of the past two fiscal years, and $80 million has been
requested for the current fiscal year. In fact, because the
Nicaraguan operations have "stretched — some would say
overextended — the agency's capabilities," more than 400
recently retired covert action specialists have been rehired by
the CIA. The Nicaragua operation, according to Taubman's

Petroleum fires rage out of control in Puerto Corinto after CIA and
contra rocket attack, causing evacuation of 40,000.

26 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

sources, "is expected to become the largest paramilitary
effort mounted by the CIA since the Vietnam War."

The numbers of people involved are hard to estimate.
There may be 10,000 contras in the north and 2,000 in the
south, all supported by the U.S. And there are so many U.S.
troops in Honduras that a Carnegie Endowment expert was
quoted by Newsweek saying, "It looks pretty grim. We're
turning Honduras into a military base."

The technology is also impressive. Sophisticated artillery
equipment is getting to the contras. and the support logistics,
provided directly by the U.S., include massive transport jets,
radar installations, underwater demolition equipment, and
the like.

The Shift in Strategy

In early September the emphasis of contra actions
noticeably shifted, from hit and run attacks on border
villages to coordinated attacks on strategic economic
objectives linked to the infrastructure of the country.
Airports, oil depots, pipelines, factories, warehouses—
these became the major targets, accounting for losses to
Nicaragua of more than $380 million. The shift, according
to the New York Times* "was the result of a decision,
reached by the CIA over the summer, that attacks directly
against industrial and transportation targets inside
Nicaragua would be a quicker and more effective way of
hurting the Sandinistas than previous efforts." (October 16,
1983.) Captured contras have confirmed that CIA officers
are directing the attacks from bases in Honduras; and many
reports have confirmed that, despite Costa Rican "neu-
trality." attacks from the south also involve CIA support
and direction.

For some time the contras in the south, Eden Pastoral
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), denied any
connection with the Somocista-led Nicaraguan Democratic
Force (FDN) in the north. But in late September, within
hours of an attack on an oil terminal at Puerto Sandino, for
which ARDE took credit, FDN spokesmen in Honduras
were briefing journalists on the raid, stating that they were
informed in advance of Pastora's actions.

Pastora and the CIA

More to the point. Pastorals pious denials of any
connection with the CIA have been totally discredited. Even
United States officials describe to journalists the assistance
funneled to Pastora. Time magazine recently reported that
some of the aid has been channeled to Pastora through Israel,
some through El Salvador. Further evidence of CIA
assistance to Pastora can be seen by the discovery, in Costa
Rica, that Miami-based Cuban exiles — the CIA's long-time
hit men— have been recruited to join Pastora's group. When
17 gusanos were ordered to leave Costa Rica, the U.S.
Ambassador complained, telling reporters that the Costa
Rican government was being "overzealous."

While on the one hand some ARDE officials deny CIA
assistance, others complain to the media that they are not
getting enough money from the CIA. One official com-
plained to the London Times reporter in San Jose
(September 14, 1983) that ARDE was competing with FDN
for the CIA's money and not getting it "to the extent we'd be
happy with."

But the most compelling research on the CIA-Pastora
connection was done by Jeff Gerth of the New York Times
(October 6, 1983). On September 8, a Cessna plane crashed

CIA frogman gear— bubbleless air recycler.

after attacking Managua's international airport in a raid for
which Pastora took credit. Four Weeks later Gerth reported
on the results of his attempt to track down the ownership
and history of that plane. He learned that until shortly
before the raid the plane was registered to the Investair
Leasing Corporation of McLean, Virginia. That company is
managed by Edgar L. Mitchell, who until 1975 had worked
for Intermountain Aviation, Inc., which was identified in the
Church Committee reports as a CIA proprietary. The
marketing director of Investair is Mark L. Peterson, and, as
Gerth carefully phrased it, "a Mark L. Peterson was
secretary and treasurer of Air America, Inc., a CIA
proprietary involved in air cargo operations." Papers found
on the pilot of the plane after it was downed even included
instructions for making clandestine contact with U.S.
Embassy personnel in San Jose. Gerth later learned that the
plane was maintained by Summit Aviation, Inc., a company
which was established in 1960 and known to have done
contract work for the CIA. (New York Times* November
8, 1983.)

The Specifics of a Coordinated Plan

The convenient cover for the plan, coordinated among the
CIA, the contras* and the Honduran armed forces, was the
joint U.S. -Honduras military exercise, Big Pine 2 (or Ahuas
Tara 2, in M iskito). The exercises began in early August and
are still continuing; as a U.S. official told the New York

Times recently, "There's no end in sight " The scope of

the exercises is vast; radar installations have been built, new
airfields have been constructed and old ones enlarged, port
facilities have been extended. The joint task force com-
mander called the exercises "a marvelous opportunity for
U.S. forces." During Big Pine 2, in late August and
throughout September, another exercise, Readex 2, brought
NATO and Atlantic Fleet ships into the Caribbean, under
thecommand of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, who went
on to lead the invasion of Grenada.

The difficulty for observers, of course, is the inability to

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 27

distinguish between exercises and the real thing. Most of the
activities against Nicaragua appear subsumed within the
joint exercise activities. For example, a major part of Big
Pine 2 involves amphibious actions, landings, frogmen
training, and the like. The commencement of all this marine
training was followed by a spate of amphibious attacks
against Nicaragua, including the mining of port facilities and
hit and run naval attacks. A Newsweek reporter saw "fifteen
frogmen loaded down with diving tanks, tubes and flippers"
in downtown Tegucigalpa (September 5, 1983). And
sophisticated frogman gear was captured by the Nicaraguans
in several clashes with contras, including extremely unusual
gear which allowed for the recyling of air so that no bubbles
would be released to float up to the surface and which
enabled divers to remain underwater for more than eight
hours without giving any signs of their presence.

At the same time that Big Pine 2 was turning Honduras
into a gigantic U.S. military base— much of which was for
the sole purpose of working with the contras in attacking
economic targets in Nicaragua— reports emerged that El
Salvador was also playing a role in the "secret" war. The
story first broke in the London Times ( September 14, 1983),
confirming that the air attacks of early September had been
launched from El Salvador, where the planes, based in Costa
Rica, were modified for bombing runs. After the raids, the
surviving aircraft returned to Costa Rica, allowing the Costa
Rican government to state carefully that the planes did not
take off from Costa Rica for the bombing raids. Eden
Pastora, who took credit for the raids, said that the bombs
had been supplied not by the United States, but by El
Salvador. But the London Times learned that the CIA and
Israel were funneling arms and munitions for Pastora
through El Salvador. (Pastora also claimed that the plane
had been given to him by El Salvador, although the New
York Times learned, as noted above, that it was a CIA
plane.)

Condeca

The most significant development relating to the roles of
El Salvador and Honduras in the war against Nicaragua has
been the revival of Condeca, the Central American Defense
Council. Condeca was founded in 1963, a military alliance
between Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and the United States. Panama and Costa Rica had observer
status. (A high Panamanian official has recently said that
Panama joined in 1974.) The alliance was fostered by the
U.S. to deal with the then young guerrilla movements in
Nicaragua and Guatemala. But Condeca fell apart in 1969
when El Salvador and Honduras fought the so-called
"football war."

However, by June 1983 the U.S. was encouraging the
revival of Condeca, without Nicaragua. And in August 1983,
when General Rios Montt was ousted in Guatemala, the
time was considered ripe for a formal reconstitution of the
alliance, which took place at a secret meeting in Guatemala
on October 1 . In light of the role played by the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in the master plan to
topple the government of Grenada, the new role of Condeca
bears careful scrutiny. One stumbling block is being dealt
with now; the charter speaks of aggression against a Central
American country from outside Central America. So, as an
insider told one of Jack Anderson's reporters, the members
will have to "rework the language." Honduran military
officers are already saying that Condeca has been revived

because of perceived threats from Nicaragua.

The danger to Nicaragua was real even before events in
Grenada demonstrated how willing the U.S. was to
intervene militarily. Honduran officials constantly speak of
the need for the overthrow of the Sandinista government,
and U.S. military and political figures have voiced similar
opinions. The U.S. representative to Condeca, General
Paul F. Gorman, recently promoted to four stars, wonders
whether diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, and says
that "all the signs- point to a military road." (Los Angeles
Times, October 5, 1983.) And Under Secretary of Defense
Fred C. Ikle has also spoken to Congress of the need for
"victory."

The contra leaders stress the analogy between OECS and
Grenada on the one hand, and Condeca and Nicaragua on
the other. FDN officials told journalists they hoped that the
Sandinista leadership would also split into factions,
allowing a Grenada-type intervention.

Disinformation

All of the disinformation campaigns directed against
Nicaragua during the last few years have moved into high
gear. These include an attempt to perpetuate the myth that
the contras have widespread support within Nicaragua,
something which any on-the-scene observer knows is not
true. The Voice of America reports are singularly insub-
stantial. Feelings against the government are commonplace,
it is reported, because the correspondent has been so
informed by "a taxi driver." Similar reports pass for news in
the major media.

The campaign to suggest that the Sandinistas are guilty ot
genocide against the Miskito Indians continues unabated;
false report after false report of massacres are spread, with
total casualty figures greater than the entire number of
Miskitos in the world.

There is also a major campaign being waged to suggest
that Costa Rica is scrupulously neutral, and is extremely
angry about the use of its territory by contras. Yet, as is well
known, Pastora and Robelo and the ARDE maintain public
offices in San Jose and reporters from around the world
interview ARDE people not only in San Jose but near the
border as well. President Monge has been forced by his own
domestic opponents to be a bit more neutral, and reluctantly
turned down an offer by the U.S. Army to provide 1,000
"engineers for road and bridge repairs" because of public
opposition. This offer was seen as an attempt by the U.S. to
launch a counterinsurgency operation from Costa Rica.

The Attacks

More than disinformation, of course, the direct attacks
are serious problems for the Nicaraguans. The list of only the
major assaults is long:

• On September 8 a light plane bombed Managua's
airport, causing one death, several woundings, and extensive
damage. The pilot and navigator were also killed when the
plane was shot down. Another small plane simultaneously
raided a residential section of Managua, dropping bombs
near the home of Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. ARDE
claimed credit for both raids.

• The same day, offshore oil loading facilities at Puerto
Sandino were bombed. The facilities were 60 feet under
water, 300 feet off shore, indicating the likely placement of
explosives by a frogman team, which might have occurred
some time prior to the detonation. The FDN claimed credit.

28 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

• The next day, September 9, an unsuccessful air attack
was made against the oil storage depot at Puerto Corinto, on
the Pacific coast about 60 miles further north than Puerto
Sandino, which is about 30 miles northwest of Managua.
The planes retreated from anti-aircraft fire and headed for
Costa Rica, suggesting another ARDE action.

• The same day an attacking plane was shot down near
the Sandinista army base at Cibalsa, on the west shore of
Lake Nicaragua, just a few miles north of the border with
Costa Rica.

• On September 25 there was a major assault on the
provincial capital of Ocotal near the Honduran border.
FDN radio broadcasts announced that they had taken the

Sandinista Militia fights off contra attack.
Number 20 (Winter 1984)

town, although in fact they never entered the town proper.
After nearly two days of fighting they were repulsed. During
the fighting the Rio Coco bridge which serves as a main link
for Ocotal with the rest of the country was bombed, as it had
been six months earlier.

• On September 27 FDN raiders attacked a Sandinista
customs post at El Espino on the Honduran border, killing
six government soldiers. Twenty contras were killed in the
attack, which was apparently intended, if successful, to
launch another attack on nearby Ocotal.

• The following day, September 28, ARDE raiders
attacked a southern border post at Penas Blancas, creating a
serious diplomatic dispute between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua about who fired across whose territory. Even the
Costa Rican papers, while whipping up war fever admitted
that the rebels had come from Costa Rica.

• On October 3, ARDE contras in speedboats attacked
the fuel depot at the Atlantic coast port of Benjamin
Zeladon, more than 100 miles up the coast from Costa Rica.

• The same day an FDN DC3 airplane was shot down by
the Sandinistas near Matagalpa, and the pilot and copilot
captured. These two later provided details to the govern-
ment, and to international journalists, of their CIA training
in Honduras. They confirmed that all of the FDN plans and
attacks were coordinated and directed by American CIA
officers, a number of whom they identified. This and all the
other downed aircraft have been linked to the U.S., through
various CIA proprietaries.

• Before midnight, October 10, CIA men and contras in
speedboats launched a successful rocket attack against the
oil tanks at Puerto Corinto. It took two days to extinguish
the fires, during which time more than 25,000 people had to
be evacuated from the city because of the extreme danger of
an explosion. Their callousness can be seen in the attack
which, had more volatile petroleum products been hit, could
have caused thousands of innocent deaths. (While the fires
were raging, Henry Kissinger and the President's National
Bipartisan Commission on Central America was meeting in
San Jose, Costa Rica with Alfonso Robelo of the ARDE.
Kissinger had previously said the Commission would not be
meeting with contras: after the Robelo meeting he said he
was not going to meet with combatants, but that Robelo was
a political leader, not a fighter.)

• On October 14, the underwater facilities at Puerto
Sandino were again bombed, the fifth attack on oil
installations in five weeks. The Exxon Corporation
announced almost immediately that it would no longer
allow its ships to be used to transport the Mexican crude oil
to Nicaragua, which accounts for more than 75% of
Nicaragua's petroleum needs. (As this attack took place.
Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley was winding
up a two-day visit to Managua, discussing possibilities of
reducing tensions between the U.S. and Nicaragua —
something the constant sabotage was hardly likely to
encourage.)

• October 1 8 saw a massacre more vicious than any of the
previous contra raids, all of which were bloody and
heartless. The small village of Pantasma was attacked by a
band of over 250, slaughtering 47 people, including six
teachers and most of the workers on two area agricultural
cooperatives. The townspeople fought heroically for ten
hours until soldiers reached the remote mountain village and
drove off the contras. As one shocked villager said, "What
they did here has no name."

CovertAction 29

Four Nicaraguan youngsters run for their lives from Honduran
mortar attack near border.

• Various fishing boats, agricultural and border commun-
ities, and ordinary Nicaraguans are daily attacked by the
com r as.

Congress and the Contras 1 Contempt

While the orders of the CIA to step up the scope and
viciousness of the attacks were carried out, the U.S.
Congress debated a proposal to provide another $80 million
"covert" aid to the contras. The House of Representatives
voted against it and the Senate voted for it, creating a
funding controversy resolved by a conference committee
which authorized $24 million, but no more, without further
congressional approval, ostensibly taking away the CIA's
power to commit unallocated funds to the operation.

But what is clear is that neither the President nor the CIA
nor the contras care very much what the Congress does or
does not do. The rebel leaders brag that their funds will not
be cut off even if Congress refuses more, and they surely
know what they are talking about. "Arrangements" have
been made, one contra leader said, for the laundering of aid
through Israel. Furthermore, President Reagan has defended
the use of covert operations such as those against Nicaragua
even if the Congress and the American people are left
uninformed, if he believes the country's "best interests are
served."

Conclusion

The reality facing the United States was discussed by
Commander Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan Minister of the
Interior, in a recent interview:

It is difficult to occupy a country where the people are
armed. . . . We are technically prepared to take on the
Honduran Army, and even all Central American

armies together In other words, the prospects for a

military victory over Nicaragua are nil. . . . So, should
an intervention come, national territorial sectors be
occupied, and a puppet government installed, inter-
national politics will force the United States to leave
that puppet government alone, providing it only with
arms and funds. What then? Could that puppet
government survive daily confrontations with people
who have tasted power and have arms in hand?

Borge made it clear, however, that his government wanted
peace, not war. He intended to come to the United States to
speak out on these issues, but President Reagan personally
refused him a visa. As the Nicaraguan Embassy noted, "he
was coming to speak of peace at a moment in which any war
in the world could lead to a nuclear confrontation." This,
sadly, frighteningly, does not deter Ronald Reagan. •

30 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

Fort Huachuca Buildup:

War Technology in the Desert

The following is part of a report circulated by a veteran
who served in intelligence in Vietnam. The implications of
this information for Central America are substantial. Such
double-checking as CAI B has been able to do indicates that
the material here is accurate, and well worth publication.

Located in a sparsely populated area of Southeast Ari-
zona, adjacent to the City of Sierra Vista, is Fort Huachuca,
which dates back to the days of the Indian Wars. Today, no
cavalry soldiers ride out to fight Cochise, for Huachuca has
become the home of the Army Communications Command
Test Facilities and the Army Intelligence School and Center,
and until recently, the most active organization on post, the
Electronic Proving Ground. If the United States military
were preparing to go into El Salvador or anywhere else in
Central America, this would be the first place things would
start to happen, because this is where the military would
work on correcting the mistakes made in Vietnam.

Things have been happening at Fort Huachuca for the last
decade, but at an eyebrow-raising rate for the last year. Late
last summer Major General Grumbacher was replaced by
Major General McKnight as Post Commander. Until then,
the numerous commands operated separately, with the Post
Commander responsible for housekeeping only. McKnight
has assumed overall command of the various functions car-
ried on at Huachuca. Brigadier General Riley of the 7th
Signal Corps of Fort Richie, Maryland, which controls
communications for the United States, Puerto Rico, and
Panama, has switched places with Brigadier General Myers
of Fort Huachuca Army Communications Command head-
quarters. Colonel William R. Harnagle, who served two
tours in Vietnam and was former director of Combat Devel-
opments Fort Gordon has assumed command of the U. S.
Army Electronic Proving Ground. All operations placed
under one commander; an officer experienced in Vietnam
taking over the proving ground; and an officer knowledge-
able in U. S. Army communications in Central America; are
significant developments.

The civilian hiring freeze imposed by President Reagan
was lifted last September for Fort Huachuca. This was to
allow the hiring of more office workers, maintenance per-
sonnel, etc. Even though the people being hired appear to be
redundant for present needs, civil service employees in areas
which have been essential to the basic mission of Huachuca
are now being laid off. The primary missions of Fort Hua-
chuca have been training military personnel in intelligence
activities, test and report on intelligence procedures, and test
electronics and communications equipment. The end result
of all this effort was the production of training and repair
manuals and the graduation of students. This has changed.

The intelligence school is graduating fewer students than
in the past, and taking much longer to do it. One local
resident who has dealt with students for years stated, "There

is something different about this batch. They are not the
same as the others in the past years."

The intelligence school is hiring no new people. Now all
vacancies are being filled with personnel who are already
employed by the school. If a position in the school becomes
vacant, an employee is given on-the-job training to teach
that subject. Someone from the outside who may have years
of experience is not hired. The intelligence school wants no
new people inside.

The civil service technical writers who have been the
backbone of the Huachuca mission for years are being laid
off. The individual in charge of the personnel department
who handles the technical writing staff says this is because
the military is contracting more of the work to civilian
companies. There are a number of private firms which do
technical writing on a contract basis. Among them are Ken-
tron, C.A. Parshell, BDM, and Man Tech. Except for Man
Tech all of these firms are about to close shop and leave
town. They say, "TRADOC (Training and Doctrine
Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia) has frozen all funds. "

The Army is saying they are contracting out their work.
The contractors say they have no work, except for one
contract to write a manual on ground sensors, those devices
first utilized in Vietnam to detect guerrilla movement. Man
Tech has three unspecified contracts. It is rather curious
that all the teaching, testing, and research done at this large
facility can be summarized by such a small number of tech-
nical writers, compared to the past.

When the Army was hiring civil service tech writers, a
Department of Defense Directive from the Intelligence
Research Industrial Directorate forbade the hiring of per-
sonnel who had served as Military Intelligence Specialists or
Military Intelligence Analysts. In other words, people who
had been trained and experienced in the analysis and inter-
pretation of intelligence were not wanted. This seems strange
until you know that the title of another training manual
written was Guerrilla Infiltration Techniques. Manuals on
guerrilla infiltration techniques and ground sensors would
tell anyone experienced in analyzing intelligence that the
military was not getting ready to stop the Russians at the
Berlin Wall.

All the contractors except for Man Tech are experiencing
hard times. Man Tech in the last year has gone from three
offices in town and on base to five, and claims to have only
thirty-four employees for these five offices. Man Tech has no
interest in tech writers, but is looking for personnel who
have tactical experience in interrogation, image interpreta-
tion, intelligence analysis, counterintelligence, and intelli-
gence collection. They want people who do it, not write it.
The contracts call for some personnel to go overseas. They
particularly want people experienced in high tech electronics
communications.

Is Man Tech recruiting for the Army? One thing learned in
Vietnam was that intelligence organizations had to be in

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 31

place and functioning when the troops landed. At present
the Army is restricted to fifty-five military advisers in El
Salvador. Through the manipulation of their own funds,
they could be planning, or have already sent an advance
intelligence team of civilians rather than military personnel.
It would be almost impossible for Congress to detect such a
movement, as there would be no financial or military records
to indicate it. Where do these people go, and for what?

In Vietnam attempts were made to train Vietnamese in
intelligence procedures. The results were not highly success-
ful often because the local military selected the candidates.
The solution would be to choose and select those people you
wanted to train, rather than allowing the various militaries
of Central America to do the choosing for you.

U. S. Border Patrolmen don't know why higher-ups single
out refugees from Central American countries, in particular
El Salvador, who during interrogation reveal that they are
intelligent and educated. Before they are sent to Tucson, a
notation of this fact is made on the documentation that
accompanies them. Is the Army or CIA recruiting people to
return to Central America as intelligence agents? If a man
was told his family could stay and would be taken care of, he
certainly might agree to cooperate.

The only thing known for sure is that the Army has
formed a Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. This new branch includes the Special
Forces, which has increased from twenty-five hundred to
fifty-five hundred persons in the last few years. Special For-
ces (commonly called Green Berets) personnel are trained to
fight insurgents, not to make secret rescue missions
into Iran.

In a guerrilla war, you often have a particular group of
people, or a village, who feel no allegiance to their govern-
ment or the rebels. Special Forces teams of up to fifteen go
to these people and give them everything from medical aid to
military training. The training of this team is quite varied.
The medics can do simple operations such as appendec-
tomies, and the weapons experts can teach the villagers how
to make explosives out of chicken droppings. Once the
quality of life has been improved, and the men trained and
armed, part of the team will stay behind to lead them. The
area surrounding these people becomes hostile to guerrilla
forces operating in the region. Needless to say, government
forces show these people much more respect. Generally they
just leave them alone.

Also, individual soldiers of the Special Forces who dem-
onstrate outstanding combat leadership are loaned to the
CIA to command small bands of mercenaries.

For some years, small numbers of Special Forces person-
nel, never more than sixty, have come to Huachuca sup-
posedly for training in the desert and mountain terrain. Why
Huachuca is picked for desert training is unclear, since the
Army has many more suitable areas. It is suspected they
come here for training with sophisticated equipment rather
than because of the terrain. This year there are a substan-
tially larger number than usual, and unlike the past, no one is
allowed near them.

For an installation its size, at present not much appears to
be happening at Fort Huachuca. Few vehicles pass up and
down its many roads. Many buildings are under-used, if at
all; yet, construction is going on at a feverish rate. The
Enlisted Men's Club and the Officers' Club, also under-
utilized, have been expanded and improved far beyond any
present need. The Field House or gymnasium has been

modernized, improved, and expanded. Large and small
buildings are being built, and numerous old ones being
remodeled. The one area that needs expansion and im-
provement, married personnel housing, is being totally
ignored. This doesn't make sense unless one recalls that only
a volunteer army is a married army. In times of war, when
you fill the ranks with drafted personnel, the military doesn't
have to worry about reenlistment rates, can freeze pay scales
(which Reagan has done), and can tell the draftee his family,
if he has one, is his problem. Arizona Senator DeConcini has
stated that less additional personnel are now at Huachuca
than in the past. Then what are the buildings for?

One building the Army is happy to tell everyone about is
the Electro-Magnetic Facility. This forty-one thousand
square foot building is to be used by the military and private
contractors to test the efforts of magnetic fields on commun-
ication and electronics equipment. The bids for this building
were put out with great publicity. Bids for another building,
supposedly concerned with satellites, were put out very
quietly and the contractors were forced to give hurried bids
on this seven thousand [square] foot building. The contract
was put out through TRW Corporation, located in McLean,
Virginia, and calls for a building framework covered by a
non-metallic skin. Undoubtedly the bids came through
TRW rather than the Army directly because the local
contractors are not to know what is going into that building.
This building is to be completed by June. Also to be
completed by June is a base for a Western Union Satellite
Receiving Station pointed 167 degrees, true, south. Taking
into consideration that the actual antenna can be varied a
few degrees, it still means it is pointing at the western coast of
Central America.

The Electronic Proving Ground at Huachuca is testing a
mobile computer and communications system called the
Maneuver Control System. Combat commanders ridicule
this system as something a businessman might use to keep
track of stock on hand, but next to useless in a war. "Two
thousand yards on a computer screen is one thing, but to
have to actually travel that distance is another. Unsuspected
enemy fire, or terrain, might force the foot soldier to have to
circle around, causing him to travel ten thousand yards."

Combat intelligence officers are not ridiculing the system,
because with it they will be able to send and receive accurate
information, up-to-the-minute information, over great dis-
tances, via satellite. This system receives, relays, transfers,
stores, processes, retrieves, and prints out data. It has a
processor, a flexible disc drive and magnetic bubble. The
Army says the bubble is a new magnetic medium used in
mass data storage because in the event of a power failure, the
memory is not lost. They also say it provides memory pro-
cessing faster than current chip memory. Commonly known
technology says that the magnetic bubble ( which is not new)
does not lose its memory in the event of a power loss, but that
it definitely provides memory processing at a much slower
rate than current chip memory.

When this contradiction was presented to an individual
who studied both computer science and physics at a presti-
gious university, he said, "It is possible. It would have to be
some sort of hybrid computer, with an ultra-sensitive
magnetic bubble. Chips would have to be used to boost its
speed, but regular chips might create too much radiation for
this new bubble. Most probably they would use compli-
mentary metal oxide semi-conductors, but they are extreme-
ly sensitive to static electricity."

32 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

If a large home base, or sort of master computer, were
located where these mobile computers could feed and re-
trieve data via satellite transmission, it would be tactical in
nature and of the same basic design so memory wouldn't be
lost in the event of power failure. It would have to be housed
in a non-metallic building if located in Southeast Arizona,
where electrical storms are common. Is it mere coincidence
that such a building shell, and a communications satellite
receiver base pointed toward El Salvador are both to be
completed by June?

This system solves part of the problem for our intelligence
failure in Vietnam. Now information can be transmitted
instantly to a center where it can be not only analyzed by
men, but by computer at the speed of light. Also, remember
the mobile computers are referred to as tactical systems.
Interrogation reports, agent reports, patrol reports, and cop-
ies of enemy documents can be sent to Huachuca for analy-
sis. Also Huachuca is perfectly located. It is far enough
beyond the horizon that Cuban technicians could not inter-
cept or interfere with any transmissions.

We still have the problem of interpreting aerial photo-
graphs and the fact that guerrillas move at night. For years
Fort Huachuca has been conducting exercises with its Mo-
hawk surveillance aircraft using infra-red film. The sensitiv-
ity of these cameras is such that they can take a picture of a
building from the air and tell you if more heat is escaping
from a window than a door. This can be explained as routine
development and testing of equipment. What can't be ex-
plained is why Huachuca needed a silver recovery process to
collect the valuable metal left over from the development of
extremely large amounts of film. To test their equipment,
they had to bring film from all over the state. That kind of
system, which is presently used by only a few civilian firms
which process massive amounts of film, would only r^e
needed if they planned to develop and analyze all the film
used in the actual fighting of a war, not for routine testing
and teaching.

As for interpreting what is on that film, it can now be done
by computer. A German, Rudolph Hell, has invented a
machine called the Hell Chromacom. The Chromacom does
for images what word processors do for words. Using a laser
it can turn a square inch of photograph into 360,000 bytes of
computer storage space. Control Data Corporation at Gree-
ly Hall, Fort Huachuca has computers that can process 100
million machine instructions per second. In other words, a
computer could analyze and interpret in one second what
would take men days. Parts of El Salvador could be photo-
graphed often and if the slightest change had occurred,
military intelligence would know about it. Of course, mas-
sive amounts of film would be used.

The last stages of the Vietnam War saw the introduction
of sensing devices that could detect enemy movement. These
devices were imperfect, but have been worked on through
the years. Ground-sensors are now used by the U. S. Border
Patrol to detect the crossing of illegal aliens. They use them
in series so they can tell the direction the object is traveling,
but even rabbits can cause a poorly placed detector to sound
a false alarm. In recent years a new security system has been
developed. It sends out a high frequency sound wave, like
sonar, that bounces back. When coupled to a small compu-
ter it can memorize everything that is in front of it, and
ignore it. Only when an unmemorized object is placed in its
field of detection will it take notice. This system, which is
now used in office buildings, is being expanded not only to

detect, but also to identify an object, when coupled with a
complex computer program. Recently a company known as
Ultra Systems moved into Sierra Vista as a contractor work-
ing for Fort Huachuca. The electrical requirements for their
building included outlets for a number of computers, and
other equipment. Among other things, Ultra Systems works
with high frequency sound equipment.

The single largest contract is for a new runway to be built
at Libby Airfield, located at Fort Huachuca. For a long time
there has been talk of improving the facilities. In November
1 98 1 , Libby was selected as the site for auxiliary training for
Arizona Air Guard and Air Force A-lOs, A-7s and F-4s.
When the improvements were approved recently, the speci-
fications had been expanded to a 12,000-foot runway with a
1,000-foot overrun. Confirmed reports state this runway is
to be constructed of eight foot thick, steel reinforced con-
crete. Even though a runway of this length is not needed for
the proposed aircraft that are to use it, the extra length could
be considered a safety factor. A runway of this extraordinary
thickness is for a plane with a tremendous "foot print pres-
sure," such as a 747 or C5A cargo plane.

None of the reasons given for building this runway makes
sense, even for the United States military. Since German
NATO pilots are no longer being trained at Davis Montham
Air Force Base in Tucson, and since four runways are closed
down at Luke Air Force Base west of Phoenix, it doesn't
seem reasonable to build a new one. This new runway is also
to be used for civilian commercial traffic, but the present
runways are quite adequate for those aircraft which fly
people in and out of the area. Residents of the area
apparently do not find it hard to believe that airlines would
use an aircraft with three times the capacity of those used to
serve Tucson, to serve Sierra Vista and the surrounding area,
with one-tenth the population. The gullibility of Cochise
County residents may be one reason why Huachuca was
picked.

The airport is also supposed to be an emergency landing
field. From the Phoenix area to the southern border there
are eight runway complexes which have strips of eight
thousand feet or longer. North of the Phoenix area, there are
only two. Why put another one in the southern half of the
state, and especially one that is almost two thousand feet
higher in altitude than all the others, making it more
dangerous to use in an emergency?

The most interesting thing about this $20 million runway
from an intelligence point of view is that it is less than twenty
air miles from the border. In all of northwest Mexico, there
is no radar. You could fly the Empire State Building across
northwest Mexico and not a soul would know it. The air-
space from Libby to the border is highly restricted and
civilian aircraft are not allowed in many areas and above
four thousand feet in the rest. People in the Pentagon who
should know about the "expanded version," don't! All they
know is that money is tight, and the rest of the military is
hanging onto their purse strings with a death grip.

A lot of new people are being seen around the city of
Sierra Vista. Even though projected growth rates of the
community are supposed to decline, the City's Planning
Commission received urgent requests from Tucson Builders
for permission to build six hundred and eighty-four new
apartments. The permits were rushed through as the builders
stated that half had to be finished by July. The Sierra Vista
City Officials said in response to this, "These builders must
know something we don't know!" #

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 33

Washington's Proxy:

Israeli Arms in Central America

By Clarence Lusane*

The war drums are beating in Central America and Israel
is an important player. The State of Israel has emerged as a
major, and in some cases, principal, supplier of arms,
advisers and training to the repressive forces in the region.
Long denounced for its military ties to South Africa,
Chile, and the Philippines, the Zionist regime has ex-
tended its role as surrogate for the U.S. to the front line of
Central America. Although much of what is happening is
held in strict secrecy, the vast extent of Israeli aid has begun
to fray the cover under which Reagan administration policy
objectives circumvent Congressional obstacles.

As this article will show, stopping U.S. military aid to
Central America also requires stopping U.S. military aid to
Israel. The information presented only scratches the sur-
face of what is probably the key link in U.S. foreign policy
under the Reagan administration. By the end of the 1960s
Israel had emerged as an arms exporter, but only since the
Reagan administration has it been a*ble to reach its poten-
tial as a full junior partner to U.S. imperialism.

The Israeli Arms Industry

Fourteen percent of Israel's industrial labor force is em-
ployed in its arms industry. If the armed forces are in-
cluded, the number rises to 25%.

According to the latest CIA estimates, Israel is the fifth
largest exporter of arms in the world. This is up from its
seventh place ranking in 1980. Israel remains the largest
supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

In 1977, Israel's arms exports were valued at $285 mil-
lion. Despite the loss of two reliable customers, Iran and
Nicaragua, by 1981, military exports had risen to $1.3
billion.

The battle-tested efficiency of Israeli weapons is well
known. The Israeli-built Uzi submachine gun, for instance,
is revered among arms merchants. Carried by U.S. Secret
Service personnel and bodyguards of oil millionaires, it is
the shining star of Israeli weaponry. It is the choice of
NATO and is used in at least 43 countries, including virtu-
ally all the nations of Latin America.

Equally reliable Israeli military hardware includes
Arava STOL (short takeoff and landing) transport air-
craft, Shafrir and Gabriel missiles, Galil assault rifles, Kfir
fighter jets, Merkava tanks, and various electronic and
computer equipment. Israel is also a major source of train-
ing in intelligence and counterinsurgency techniques.

♦Clarence Lusane is a free-lance writer in Oakland, California, formerly a
member of the CAIB staff. The sidebars for this article were all written by
Dana Reed, a free-lancer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Since 1970, Israel's military budget has consumed more
than 30% of its national budget. Limited domestic use has
made the export of arms essential to its economic survival.
Latin American money has become indispensable to the
Israeli arms industry. As we shall see, war torn Central
America has become a goldmine for Israeli arms sales.

It must be pointed out that Israel's goals are political as
well as economic. Stability of the current and international
political order is a chief objective of Israeli foreign and
military policy. In country after country, we can observe
how Israeli arms sales meet these twin aims.

Honduras

The bodies were still warm after the Israeli-sanctioned
massacres at Sabra and Shatila when then Israeli Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon and the Air Force Chief arrived in
Honduras. In his 38-hour visit, Sharon and the Hondurans
agreed that Israel would send Honduras 12 Kfir planes,
radar equipment, light weapons and spare parts and 50
advisers. Military training was also proposed. Incidentally,
upon leaving Honduras, Sharon flew to the U.S. AFP, the
French News Agency, observed the deal "could intensify
the danger of unleashing an arms race in the region."

Less than six months later, the New York Times report-
ed on its front page that Israel was sending weapons to
Honduras. These included artillery pieces, mortar rounds,
mines, hand grenades, and ammunition. Much, if not all,
of these arms were to go to U.S. -backed counterrevolu-
tionaries seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government
from bases in Honduras.

It was also reported that the Honduran Armed Forces
Commander, Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, visited a CIA
training facility in Virginia earlier this year to examine
captured PLO weapons. Israel has stated that it would
provide captured weapons to any Central American
military government for only the cost of transporting them.

According to knowledgeable sources in Tegucigalpa and
Washington, General Alvarez is the major Honduran
official giving orders to the contras. Despite denials by
Honduras that it is involved with the counterrevolutionary
forces, spokesmen for the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
continue to complain of the bad advice they receive from
the Hondurans.

In the period of 1970-1980, Honduras received the fol-
lowing weapons from Israel: 12 Dassault Super Mystere
fighters; 4 Arava (STOL) transports; 1 Westwind recon-
naissance plane; 14 RBY Mk armored cars; 5 fast patrol
boats (unconfirmed); 106-mm mortars; and 106-mm rifles.

The estimated $25 million in weapons promised to Hon-
duras by Sharon is a continuation of past practice. How-

34 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

ever, Honduras is now playing a new role in Central Amer-
ica, similar to the one Israel plays in the Middle East. It has
become strategically important to U.S. interests and goals
in the region. As a rear base for the contras attacking
Nicaragua, and as a training ground for Guatemalan and
Salvadoran fascists, Honduras must be armed. Deter-
mined not to be inhibited by congressional or public opin-
ion, the Reagan administration has given the Israelis the
go-ahead in Honduras. In addition to aid from the U.S.
and Israel, Honduras has received military aid from Argen-
tina and Chile, allowing it to increase its armed forces
six-fold since 1970 (from 5,000 to over 30,000). The Hon-
duran Air Force is the most powerful in Central America.

U.S. offiicals have admitted that Israeli assistance is
important in achieving Reagan administration military

/ \

Two thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine Latin
Americans have been trained in Israel, mostly in "short
courses," including police and military training.

V J

and political goals. Worried about potential congressional
locks on aid to the Nicaraguan contras, the administration
wants to be sure supply lines are not disturbed. U.S. mili-
tary aid to Honduras will go toward buying weapons from
Israel which have themselves been produced with U.S.
military aid.

By its own account, the U.S. has at least 300 military
advisers, technicians, and engineers in Honduras. The U.S.
is spending $20 million to construct a modern airport at
Comayagua to accommodate U.S. t*oop transports.
Another four airstrips are being expanded to handle mil-
itary jets. Future plans include the installation of new radar
and electronic surveillance posts, the positioning of large
stocks of military equipment, and the initial phases of
construction of a planned $150 million air and naval base
on the Atlantic coast.

It is the goal of the U.S., with the critical assistance of
Israel, to make Honduras the chief gendarme of Central
America. The second poorest nation in the region (behind
Haiti) will continue to buy arms from Israel at the expense
of its own people. Like its neighbors in El Salvador and
Guatemala, Honduras increasingly violates the human
rights of its citizens with the helping hand of Israel. There is
one central objective in the U.S. -Honduras-Israel connec-
tion. If the conditions ripen to where U.S. policy makers
launch an all-out invasion of Nicaragua, it will duplicate
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, except that it will be
launched from Honduran soil.

El Salvador

From his first days in office, Ronald Reagan pledged to
draw the line against communism in El Salvador. The
murderous and corrupt Salvadoran junta, a politically split
U.S. Congress, and the superior fighting capacities of the
FMLN guerrillas have turned out to be difficult obstacles.
He sleeps well, however, knowing that any hesitation by
the U.S. Congress to send military aid finds a willing
substitute in Israeli aid.

An example of this backdoor approach occurred in 1 98 1
when the Administration was scrambling to find more aid
to send El Salvador. Israel agreed to "lend" the U.S. $21
million to give to El Salvador, money which came from

previous U.S. aid to Israel. In other words, the U.S. cyni-
cally took out a loan on its original funds, thereby violating
the expressed will of Congress.

The U.S. has only recently become a major supplier of
military aid to El Salvador. Through all of the 1970s, Israel
was the biggest seller of weapons and aircraft to the coun-
try. The North American Congress on Latin America
(NACLA) reports the following sales of military hardware
to El Salvador: 17 Arava (STOL) transports; 6 Fouga
Magister trainers; 18 Dassault Ouragarrfrghters; 200 80-
mm rocket launchers; 200 9-mm Uzi submachine guns; am-
munition; and spare parts.

This arsenal made up more than 80% of El Salvador's
military imports during the period. It has been supple-
mented by an estimated 100 Israeli advisers (almost twice
the official number the U.S. claims to have). These advis-
ers, like their U.S. counterparts, are training the Salvado-
ran military in counterinsurgency strategy and tactics at a
secret base near Tegucigalpa.

In addition, Israeli pilots are believed to be flying Israeli-
made aircraft against the guerrillas. El Salvador has the
infamous distinction of being the first Latin country to
receive these advanced combat fighters. The Gouga Magis-
ters and Dassault Ouragans are actually outmoded French
planes which have been overhauled by Israel Aircraft In-
dustries Ltd. (IAI). They were fitted with motors manufac-
tured by the U.S. company, Pratt & Whitney.

Israel has also set up advanced computer systems to
gather and analyze intelligence about the citizenry. Similar
to the Israeli-installed computers in Guatemala, the net-
work in El Salvador also monitors changes in water and
electricity consumption.

The popular struggle to cut off aid to El Salvador has
won some limited victories. The Reagan administration
must now certify every six months that the Salvadoran
government is improving its human rights record and aid
has been partially cut. While certification has routinely
been granted each time, the imposition is not welcomed by
the Reagan administration.

Even these slight gains, however, are made negligible by
the capacity and willingness of the Israelis to help fill the
shoes of the U.S. All Israeli aid to El Salvador comes from
American military and economic aid to Israel. It has been
noted that some of the most vocal congressional critics of
Reagan policy objectives in El Salvador are also unques-
tioning supporters of aid to Israel.

Thus far denied by elected officials and ignored by many
progressive activists, the fact is that to cut off U.S. aid to El
Salvador also requires cutting or limiting aid to Israel.

Somoza's Nicaragua

Until the very end, Israeli arms poured into Somoza's
Nicaragua. After the cold-blooded killing of journalists by
Somoza's National Guard in 1978, President Carter cut off
all U.S. aid to Nicaragua. Israel, bolstered by U.S. aid to it,
picked up the slack and until July 2, 1979, just two weeks
before the Sandinistas won the final battle, provided 98%
of Somoza's arms. According to NACLA, Israeli weapons
to Somoza in the decade preceding his fall included: 2
Arava (STOL) transports; Galil assault rifles; ammunition;
patrol boats; and radios.

When questioned about selling arms to Somoza, Israeli
Prime Minister Menachem Begin responded, "We have* a
debt of gratitude with Somoza." In 1948, the U.N. General

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 35

Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine and the
creation of a Jewish state. The new State of Israel needed
weapons and had almost nowhere to turn. Israel struck a
deal with Somoza. Somoza appointed Yehuda Arazi as a

r \

"Galil rifles sold by Israel to the regime of Anastasio
Somoza in mid-1978 were sent directly to a special
terror unit commanded by Somoza's son, which
carried out the murder of political opponents, among
them women and children. n Davar, November 13,
1979.

^ )

Nicaraguan Ambassador to Europe where he could pur-
chase weapons in the name of Nicaragua. Eventually, all
the weapons ended up in Israel. All of this was accom-
plished for a mere $200,000. Arazi, it turned out, was a
member of the Jewish underground's clandestine army
organization, Haganah.

Guatemala

The U.S. is not the primary supplier of arms to Guate-
mala. Since 1976, Israel has been the main provider of
weapons, aircraft, and training to Guatemala. In fact, be-
tween 1977 and 1981, after the U.S. cut off aid due to gross
human rights violations, Israel was the only nation giving
military aid to the regime.

Weaponry to Guatemala has included: 10 RBY Mk
armored cars; 15,000 5.56-mm Galil assault rifles; and 4
field kitchens. Since 1976, Guatemala has bought at least
1 1 Arava aircraft, designed for short takeoff and landing. It
has been reported that Israelis have been acting as pilots
and maintenance technicians for these planes.

Training of Guatemalan military strongmen by Israel
has included education in the use of terror and interroga-
tion techniques, modern intelligence methods and psycho-
logical warfare. Israeli advisers are the key link in Guate-
malan counterinsurgency operations. From national plan-
ning to civilian rural cooperative programs to military
maneuvers, Israel is centrally involved.

Israel's connection with the right-wing and repressive
forces of Guatemala are hardly secret. Israeli advisers have
trained many of the officers of Guatemala's police intelli-
gence (G-2). In reference to the guerrillas fighting the ever-
changing military juntas which have come to power, the
right wing openly calls for the "Palestinianization" of the
rebelling Mayan Indians.

As with Somoza, Guatemala's relationship to the Zionist
state goes back to 1948 when Israel was created. One of the
three U.N. Commissioners overseeing the establishment of
Israel was from Guatemala. Despite the numerous changes
in power in Guatemala over the years, it has remained a
consistent and staunch supporter of Israel.

Today, Guatemala-Israel relations are better than ever.
Extensive trade and economic agreements have been
signed recently. Bilateral tourism contracts were signed in
March 1982 with the expressed purpose of rebuilding
Guatemala's lagging tourist industry. INGU AT, the Guate-
malan tourist board, is advertising in the Jewish communi-
ties of New York City, Miami, and Los Angeles.

First and foremost, however, Israel's relations with Gua-
temala are military. Some of Israel's most advanced elec-

tronic and computer technologies have been installed in
Guatemala. Hit lists used by the death squads have been
computerized. Technologically sophisticated murder is
coordinated by a Regional Telecommunications Center
(RTC) built and managed by Israeli Army experts. The
RTC is also linked to the U.S. Army's Southern Command
at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The RTC is run
by the generals from the fourth floor of the National
Palace Annex.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has
said that the RTC is Guatemala's principal presidential
level security agency and works with a high level security
network. Further, AID claims that it links the key officials
of the National Police, Treasury Police, Detective Corps,
Ministry of Government, the Presidential Palace, and the
Military Communications Center.

The Tel Aviv newspaper Haolam Hazeh and the London
Guardian revealed in December 1982 that Israeli advisers
work closely with Guatemala's G-2 police units in the use of
interrogation and torture. In this activity, they work close-
ly with Argentina and Chile, both of which have long track
records in the art.

Computerized death lists are a mainstay of government
terror and inspired a "spy-on-thy-neighbor" campaign. By
1980, computers already listed 80% of the Guatemalan
population.

In November 1981, the Israeli-sponsored Army Elec-
tronics and Transmission School was opened in Guate-
mala. At its opening, the Israeli Ambassador to Guatemala,
Moshe Dayan [no relation to the former Defense Minister
of the same name] said that the school was the first of its
kind in Latin America. Its purpose is to teach computer
and electronic monitoring of the Guatemalan people.
Equipment at the school is capable of doing everything
from checks on potential apartment renters to detecting
changes in electricity consumption that supposedly might
indicate that an illegal printing press is in operation.
Should you be detected as a potentially subversive tenant

r~ : \

The military governments of Latin America have
found the kibbutz example favorable for the pacifi-
cation of the countryside, especially when combined
with the American counterinsurgency strategy of the
strategic hamlet. The most recent example has been
seen in Guatemala, but in the past these programs were
tried in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.

\_ J

or an excessive user of electricity, modern Guatemalan
technology could identify you for a death list.

Israel has also been helpful in developing Guatemala's
major military-civilian programs. The Guatemalan mil-
itary has attempted to create Vietnam-style strategic ham-
lets. The means of implementing these counterinsurgency
plans were couched in terms of establishing peasant coop-
eratives similar to the kibbutzim in Israel. Guatemalan and
Israeli agricultural and military officials were exchanged
and it soon became apparent that the goals of the program
were to crush peasant support and participation in the
armed struggle.

The U.S., becoming involved through AID, sent "ex-
perts" and provided credits and grants. These civic pro-
grams were to take place in the Ixcan area. This is the major
base of support for the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP),

36 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

one of the major rebel forces fighting to overthrow a suc-
cession of repressive governments.

Under the recently overthrown Rios Montt regime, the
Israeli model was put into full operation. In August 1982, a
"Plan of Assistance to Conflict Areas" (PAAC) program
was begun. The PAAC program reproduced many of the
tactics applied by the Israelis on the West Bank, such as
finding mayors willing to accommodate to the status quo.

Rios Montt's strategic relations with Israel began before
his March 23, 1982 coup. Tel Aviv newspapers reported
that 300 Israeli advisers had helped to execute the takeover.
Rios Montt confessed to an American reporter that many
of his soldiers were trained by Israel.

On August 8, 1983, Rios Montt was overthrown in
another military coup led by General Oscar Humberto
Mejia Victores. Mejia, who was Defense Minister under
Rios Montt, is also a fierce anti-communist. It is doubtful
that U.S. and Israeli support will dwindle under Mejia's
rule. Gaining almost immediate recognition from the U.S.,
Mejia's pledges to return to civilian rule, abolish secret
tribunals and end Rios Montt's "state of alarm" were re-
ceived enthusiastically by the Reagan administration.
While the precise U.S. role in this latest coup is unclear, it
has been reported that some of the Israeli-trained officers
that brought Rios Montt to power also participated in his
overthrow.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica's northern border has become an operational
base for attacks by contras on Nicaragua. Former Sandi-
nista turned traitor, Eden Pastora., leads a small army
estimated at 5,000 from this border area.

At one point, Pastora claimed that he had to shut down
his activities because he had run out of funds. He stated
that because of his "anti-U.S." stance, he would not accept
funds from the CIA. Within days he was fighting again,
reportedly with an infusion of funds from Israel, as well as
other countries. In fact, much of this was a propaganda
charade, as Pastora has been receiving CIA aid all the time.

Although Costa Rica has no army, Israeli military train-
ers and arms are beginning to pour into the country. In

c \

Since the U.S. cannot legally train or arm a country
with only a police force, "it is understood that Israel is
to sell arms and give counterinsurgency training to the
Costa Rican police." Ha 'aretz, November 1, 1982.

v J

1982, President Luis Alberto Monge met with Menachem
Begin in Washington. They discussed the possibility of
Israeli military aid in building up Costa Rican security
forces. The funds would come from Washington.

The U.S. has been pressuring Costa Rica to consolidate
its security forces. This would include a 5,000-member
Civil Guard, a 3,000-member Rural Guard, 1,700 prison
guards, the 100-member National Security Agency, and
the Chilean-trained, 500-member Organization of Judicial
Investigation. In 1983, the U.S. will have spent $150,000 to
train 103 members of Costa Rica's security forces, three
times the amount spent in 1982.

Israel has been chosen by AID to build a $10 million
settlement project along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border.
The military squeeze that the contras are currently operat-

ing from Honduras and Costa Rica would obviously be
enhanced should the U.S. Congress fund this proposal.

The U.S. Role

Has exposure of illegal arms transfers by Israel forced
the U.S. to cut back on aid? Or has the fact that Israel has
sent arms to countries which the U.S. Congress and others
have designated as flagrant violators of basic human rights
made the Reagan administration voice any criticism of
Israel? The answer to both questions is no.

Relative to its size and needs, the immense scale of
continued U.S. military and economic aid to Israel is
obscene. Even after last summer's internationally con-
demned invasion of Lebanon, Israel remains the largest
recipient of U.S. foreign aid. It receives about one-third of
all U.S. foreign aid, which in the last 10 years has amounted
to about $25 billion, or roughly $7 million a day.

Even more shocking, since 1976 Israel has not spent a
penny of its own for military imports. The average U.S.
subsidy to Israel for military imports has been 129% of the
actual cost of those imports.

In the current fiscal year, Israel will receive $785 million
in economic assistance and $1.7 billion in military aid. It
will receive the same amounts in the fiscal year which began
October I, 1983.

Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, was in Washing-
ton in late July to discuss more military aid and the right to
use U.S. aid to develop weapon systems that are currently
only available in the U.S. The State Department and White
House refused to comment on the results of the meeting,
but an Israeli official said "this trip was one of the most
successful trips ever made by an Israeli minister to
Washington."

The above figures shed light on the important and cen-
tral role that Israel plays in U.S. foreign policy goals. No
amount of struggle against U.S. aid to repressive dictator-
ships and juntas will be complete, or even marginally
successful, unless Israel is also taken to task. •

NOTE:

After our last issue exposed the fact that the late Robert G.
Deindorfer had worked as a spy under journalistic cover, the
truth was admitted. His name appeared on the "In
Memoriam" list published in Periscope, the quarterly
bulletin of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

In Latin America Israel has found clients. Here can
be found some of the most brutal and repressive
regimes of modern times most in need of Israel's
"technical" and military assistance. In exchange for
this assistance and cooperation, Israel has found some
of its most vocal support in international affairs. Israel
has even been granted observer status in the Organiza-
tion of American States. The only other country to
enjoy this special status is Spain.

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 37

Pak In The Saddle Again

By Fred Clarkson*

The minions of Korean cult leader Sun Myung Moon
are hard at work in Latin America. In some countries, the
Moonies have become a major force in politics, business,
and the media. In Uruguay, for example, Moon's organiza-
tions own a 500-room luxury hotel, two newspapers, a
radio station, the largest book publishing house, and a
meat packing plant. (Washington Post, August 28, 1983.)
There is open speculation in the press about whether Uru-
guay will become the first "Unificationist republic. "
(Miami Herald October 21, 1982.)

These and other such extraordinary developments are
largely the work of Bo Hi Pak, who is from all available
evidence, the real brains and power in Moon's multi-
national operations, including Moon's Latin American
political arm: CAUSA (Confederation of the Associations
for the Unification of the Societies of the Americas).
CAUSA was founded in 1980 and claims, in its conference
invitations, to be active in 18 countries.

Pak, best known as a central character in the Koreagate
influence peddling scandal of the 1970's, has had a key role
in the development of Moon's Unification 1 Church from the
early days. As a young army officer he helped stage the
coup that brought former Korean dictator Park Chung
Hee to power and with guidance and support from the CIA
was among the founders of the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency (KC1A), where he attained the rank of colonel.
Before "retiring" to become a full-time Moonie he was the
military attache at the Korean Embassy in Washington.
During this period he was reportedly the liasion with the
American intelligence community, and made regular visits
to the National Security Agency. (See Gifts of Deceit, by
Robert Boettcher.) Through his many roles in Moon or-
ganizations, Pak plays Chief Executive Officer to Moon's
Chairman of the Board.

CAUSA began in the Southern Cone nations of Argen-
tina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, with seminars entitled:
"Unificationism: A Solution to Communism," purporting
to present a cogent unifying platform against Marxism for
the right-wing elites who attend by special invitation. The
seminars pleased the local dictators well, despite the heavy
infusion of Moon theology. Pak told the Chilean seminar
in 1981 that although "Chile is still seen as a villain in the
liberal press, I think the day will come when the world will
recognize this nation as a fountain of hope." Likewise,
Chilean General Claudio Lopez said: "We know that . . .
Rev. Moon and yourself are pillars in the struggle against
international communism."

Pak is also directing a campaign at the U.S. Hispanic
community through the Times-Tribune Corp., publisher of
the Washington Times, New York Tribune, and since 1980,
Noticias del Mundo, a Spanish language daily distributed

♦Fred Clarkson is a free-lance investigative journalist based in Wash-
ington, DC.

in New York, Washington, and other American cities. It is
often cited as an authoritative source by South American
papers. Significantly, Pak's Executive Vice President is
Sang In Kim, of whom the 1978 U.S. congressional report
on Koreagate stated that he was an early Moonie who
participated in the Park coup; was Park's translator during
his first state visit to the U.S., and was a former KCIA
station chief in Mexico City who "made frequent trips to
Washington; and there is reason to believe [he] was Tong-
sun Park's 'control officer' in the KCIA." Park was the
linch-pin of the Koreagate conspiracies. (See Investigation
of Korea — American Relations, Report of the Subcom-
mittee on International Organizations of the House Com-
mittee on International Relations, October 31, 1978,
p. 363.)

Such longtime involvements are not unusual among the
true believers, and the black-and-white world view of the
Moon organizations is characteristic as well. According to
Moon theology, these are the last days, in which Moon, the
Messiah, will lead the forces of God over the forces of
Satanic communism to create the kingdom of God on
earth.

During the past year, Honduras has become a major
battleground in CAUSA's anti-communist crusade. Pak
has a close relationship with the military and business elite,
notably General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the military
chief and de facto dfctator. Alvarez is said to want to use
CAUSA to build support for a national security state,
instead of the year-old civilian democracy. Alvarez's
heaven on earth has been temporarily thwarted by the
Catholic Bishops of Honduras. Following a warning about
"cults" by the Pope and a Vatican briefing about the his-
tory and goals of the Moonies, the Bishops issued a pastor-
al letter denouncing CAUSA and the Moonies as "anti-
Christian" and warned of "serious dangers to the psycho-
logical, religious and civic integrity of anyone who yields to
its influence." The public controversy that followed forced
prominent Hondurans to back off a bit; Honduras is over
90% Catholic. Nevertheless, CAUSA remains a powerful
force in the country.

About the time Pak first arrived in Honduras (November
1982 according to the April 17, 1983 Boston Globe), a
Presidential "Office of International Information" was set
up to deal with the problems created by the war being
waged against Nicaragua from Honduran soil. The office is
headed by Presidential Press Secretary Amilcar Santama-
ria, a leading public defender of CAUSA who attended the
Moon sponsored "World Media Conference" (WMC) in
Seoul, South Korea, October 1982. Also attending were
Oswaldo Soto Rector of the National University; Herman
Padgett, the Honduran Consul General in New York; and
several right-wing Honduran journalists. The WMC brings
several hundred such people from around the world semi-
annually (all expenses paid) to rally for anti-communist

38 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

perspectives in journalism. Closer ties between Honduras
and South Korea are suggested by reciprocal military visits
and all-expense-paid trips to South Korea for Honduran
businessmen, courtesy of Bo Hi Pak.

Meanwhile, another WMC was held in Guatemala in
June. This event featured former South Vietnamese Pre-
mier Nguyen Cao Ky, who believes the media played a
major role in the defeat of South Vietnam. After the WMC,
CAUSA flew delegates to El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Honduras on a Boeing 707 for day trips. When in Hon-
duras, they attended a reception at the Office of Interna-
tional Information hosted by Bo Hi Pak. In each country,
delegates met with business and military leaders. (See El
Grqfico (Guatemala), June 14, 1983; El Heralclo (Hondu-
ras). June 10, 1983; and Washington Post, August 28,
1983.)

The convergence of such a variety of interests through
Pak, suggests much more influence than the Moonies usu-
ally get credit for.

FLASH: According to a reliable journalistic source just
returned from Central America, one of the Nicaraguan
contra leaders, Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro of the
UDN-FARN, was approached more than two years ago by
Moonies to attend meetings (all expenses paid) in San
Francisco, New York, and perhaps elsewhere, aimed at
unifying the various anti-Sandinista groups. Chamorro
said he went to the meetings, but declined to follow Moon's
lead, for fear of Moon domination. Asked if he had taken
any Moon money, he said he hadn't but might if there were
no strings attached. •

(C ontinued from page 44.)

hidden, notebooks that could be chewed as gum if
discovered, and secret writing materials. Eventually they
gave her a bottle of poisoned wine for D'Escoto. Moncada
exposed the plan, and a film of her receiving the poisoned
bottle of wine was given to the press when the expulsions
were announced.

Although the U.S. denied the plot, even the Christian
Science Monitor editorial said "it cannot be ruled out that
the embassy personnel were up to something," while The
Nation said "it may be more common-sensical than
pathological to fear the worst from Washi/igton."

This plot was neither the first nor the last in Nicaragua. In
February of 1982 a bomb exploded on an airplane in
Managua, killing four baggage handlers. The flight had
originated in New Orleans, and the bomb was generally
presumed to have been planted by CIA-trained Cuban
rightists. And last August two captured Nicaraguan contras
confessed to having planned to kill D'Escoto, Ernesto
Cardenal, and Vice Chancellor Nora Astorga. One of the
men, Jorge Ignacio Ramirez Zelaya, said a CIA agent
named Mike Tock was behind the plot.

When assassination becomes a way of life, it can get out of
hand. That may have been what happened in the case of the
murder of El Salvador's Archbishop Oscar Romero,
attributed by Robert White to Roberto D'Aubuisson. It is
also the most reasonable explanation for the assassination of
Benigno Aquino in the Philippines last August. While it is
certainly true that the U.S. did not order Aquino killed,
indeed by the time of his death he was probably the leader
favored by the U.S., nevertheless it was the CIA in the fifties
under Edward Lansdale that made murder a way of life
there. By 1954, as we saw in Part 2 of this series, CIA station
chief Ralph B. Lovett was plotting the assassination of
Philippine nationalist leader Claro M. Recto. It should
come as no surprise to the CIA's killers that the Marcos
dictatorship has learned its lessons well, even when they are
applied in a way that the U.S. finds embarrassing.

The other major assassination of recent months was that
ot Grenada's Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. Is it not
possible that the CIA had a hand in this also'.'

On the surface it doesn't seem likely. Credible reports say
that Bishop was killed as a consequence of factional strife
within the New Jewel Movement, in which Bishop was
opposed by people more hardline than he.

Nevertheless, we would do well to recall the CIA's plot to
poison Chou En-lai during a v isit to Burma in 1958, which
was to be accompanied by a "black" propaganda campaign
that would have blamed the Soviet KGB for his death. (See
Part 1.) Bearing that in mind, it could be meaningful that
Gen. Hudson Austin, one of the leaders of the coup that
ousted Bishop and then killed him, was described in a secret
CIA report two years ago as pro-American. •

Grenada: Nobody's Backyard

Historical perspective of U.S. destabilization against
Grenada during first year of revolution— events which
later led to coup and invasion.

A 16 mm, 60-minute color documentary film.
Includes interviews with late Prime Minister Maurice
Bishop, former Guyanese P.M. Cheddi Jagan, Chilean
patriot Isabel Letelier, Workers Party of Jamaica leader
Trevor Munroe, and former CIA officer Philip Agee.

Produced by CovertAction Information Bulletin;
directed by Ellen Ray. For rental information, telephone
(202) 265-3904 or (212) 254-1061, or write to P.O. Box
50272, Washington, DC 20004.

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 39

The Korean Spy Plane:

Flight 007 Aptly Named

By Ken Lawrence

Korean Air Lines flight number 007 was not the first spy
plane downed by the Soviet Union, but its cover has held up
better than previous ones, with a strong assist from many of
the major U.S. media, giving the Reagan administration a
significant victory in its march toward ever-widening war.

According to Duncan Campbell writing in the London
New Statesman, "since 1950 the United States has lost at
least 27 aircraft forced or shot down and seen 60 others
attacked in the course of electronic or photographic
reconnaissance activity. At least 139 U.S. servicemen have
died in this reconnaissance programme. " He adds, "More
than 900 attempts have been made, by the Soviet Air Force
and others, to shoot down the super-secret SR-71
'Blackbird/ None has succeeded, for it flies too high and
too fast."

Very few of these aircraft have received much attention
in the news media, even the ones that have been shot down,
but they are known in the aviation and espionage trades
and, despite the fact that they are entirely illegal, they are
considered matter-of-fact. The April 1979 issue of Air
Classics magazine ran a photograph of four U-2 airplanes
shot down by the People's Republic of China in the 1960s.

On occasion, when coupled with important political
events, they erupt into public view, as happened in the case
of the best known U-2 flight of all, the one piloted by
Francis Gary Powers over the U.S.S.R. in May of 1960
which torpedoed the scheduled Eisenhower-Khrushchev
summit meeting. But details of another spy flight shot
down over the Caucasus two years before Powers' weren't
made public until this year.

Spy flights that violate the airspace of another country
are not labeled as such. When Powers began his U-2 career
with the CIA, his identity card showed him to be an
employee of Lockheed on loan to the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). In other words, he
and his colleagues were under civilian deep cover.

The CIA unit to which Powers belonged was officially
called the second Weather Observational Squadron
(Provisional). The first NACA news release about the U-2,
issued in April 1956, said the plane would be used to study
turbulence and meteorological conditions in Nevada. The
second announced the program was being extended to
Europe. Powers and his fellow spies were instructed to tell
parents and friends that their flying missions were tied in
with the then forthcoming International Geophysical Year
in various parts of the globe.

After Powers was shot down, the U.S. government
announced that a NACA weather plane had strayed off
course over Turkey into Soviet skies when the pilot
developed oxygen trouble. After Khrushchev disclosed that
the pilot had been captured, the State Department
abandoned the cover story, but said that Washington had
not authorized the spy flight. Two days later, Eisenhower

admitted to the press that he had authorized the flight, and
said the overflights would continue.

A similar sequence of lies followed by corrections has
emanated from Washington concerning KAL 007 but,
despite that, since no one from the crew of that flight sur-
vived to testify as to the true mission, the proof that it was on
an espionage mission is largely circumstantial. Nevertheless,
it is persuasive to experts, but what has obscured the truth is
the continued insistence by U.S. officials that a civilian
airliner would never be used for such a purpose.

This is demonstrably false. The earliest spy aircraft of the
Cold War era were mostly converted military planes — B-29
Superfortresses, SA-1 6 Albatrosses, later RB-47s— followed
by the U-2 and then the SR-71 designs which were
specifically engineered for spying over "denied" territory.
But civilian cargo and transport planes have been widely
used too, reaching their peak when the CIA operated a vast
network of proprietary airlines on a "commercial" basis,
including Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport,
Intermountain Aviation, and others. Aircraft currently in
use by proprietary airlines in Central America include
Beechcraft King Airs, Cessna 404s, and DC-3s. Modern
reconnaissance craft, including the well known AWACS
and RC-135, are modified airliners.

The mission determines what type of aircraft is most
appropriate, and at times it includes regularly scheduled
commercial airliners, despite a statement by the United
States Information Agency, repeated twice in its report
"The Shootdown of KAL 007," that "The United States
does not involve commercial airliners in intelligence
activities." (Let us leave aside the likelihood that this may
have been carefully worded legalese to avoid saying
whether South Korea uses commercial airliners in
intelligence activities, on its own, or on behalf of the U.S.,
or both. Virtually every important sentence in the report
would fail that sort of scrutiny.)

Even Leslie Gelb in the New York Times reported that
the U.S. used commercial airliners for cover "in the 1950s
when the CIA outfitted commercial flights with equipment
to spy on activities in East Germany as the planes flew to
and from Berlin." A number of French press accounts have
quoted former agents of SDECE, the French secret service,
saying that French passenger planes have made "hundreds"
of spy flights at the behest of the CIA while en route to
Moscow. Rudolf Braunberg, a former pilot for the West
German airline Lufthansa, has written in Deutsches
Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, a West German weekly paper,
that "since 1947 32 civil planes have been shot down for
violating foreign airspace," one of them by NATO. These,
however, have not caused the outcry that KAL 007 has.

Many experts smelled something fishy from the earliest
reports about the downing of the airliner. Ironically it was
Gen. George Keegan, the retired head of Air Force

40 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

intelligence and of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a well
known war hawk and anticommunist extremist, who was
quoted as having said immediately afterward, "I have never
failed to be surprised at how careless the Koreans are,
despite the risks of flying near Soviet air space. Despite all
the Soviets have there, the Koreans continue to fly too
close. The Koreans continue to bruise the Soviets on this.
What happened today they invited."

As pertinent facts dribbled out bit by bit — that an RC-
135 reconnaissance plane was flying nearby KAL 007 in the
early part of its flight; that a second RC-135 was
somewhere about; that two Orion maritime reconnaissance
aircraft were in the area of its later travel; that the Korean
flight's movements over the most militarily sensitive areas
of the Soviet Union coincided with the orbital overflights
of the U.S. Ferret-D satellite; and that the U.S. frigate
Badger was stationed at what would have been where KAL
007 emerged from Soviet airspace had it not been
downed— the official U.S. story began to unravel.

First the U.S. charged that the Soviet Union had
deliberately shot down a plane known to be an unarmed
civilian jetliner. Later the State Department admitted the
consensus of U.S. intelligence was that the U.S.S.R.
believed it was monitoring and bringing down an RC-135.
Initially the U.S. claimed that no warning was given to the
airliner, and a tape of radio transmissions was played that
purported to prove it, but later an "amended" version on
the tape was released that supported the Soviet claim that
warning shots had been fired. According fco Alexander
Cockburn in the Village Voice, the State Department
mistranslated part of the tape in which the Soviet pilot
reported the target "does not respond to inquiries" as "does
not respond to IFF" [Identify Friend or Foe, a frequency
the Boeing 747 would not have received]. Much was made
of the difference in the sizes and profilesof thetwo types of
planes, but everyone now seems to agree that the Soviet
interceptor's approach was behind and beneath the Boeing
747, from sufficient distance that comparative size would
have been difficult to discern regardless of whose weather
report is more reliable, and where its "distinctive hump"
would not have been visible. Moreover, the RC-135, though
smaller, has a hump similar to that of a 747. Le Monde
confirmed that KAL 007 was flying without lights until some
time after the interceptor was "locked on" target, after which
time came the reports of flashing lights quoted by the U.S.

Then began the quibbling. There was no need for KAL
007 to spy, because satellite photos would be as good as
those from a lower altitude. But even if night photography
had been the plane's mission, photo-interpreters would
dispute this, especially concerning oblique views and stereo
pairs. (Interestingly, when Khrushchev argued that U-2
flights were needless provocations because of the quality of
satellite surveillance, CIA director Allen Dulles said they
were needed. In the current dispute, Cockburn pointed out
in the Voice that, since satellite orbits are known and can be
anticipated, spy flights are utilized to see things concealed
from the satellite's scheduled flyby.)

In the New York Times Gelb argued that this was
nighttime, and infrared cameras "are ineffective above a few
thousand feet." Why then, Cockburn asked, do satellites
carry infrared cameras? Gelb wrote, "The only imaging
system that works at higher altitudes at night is something
called synthetic aperture radar," which "is fairly large and is
said to take up a lot of space." How, then, do they fit it inside

the nose of F- 1 5s, which regularly carry it, Cockburn wanted
to know.

Huge doubts were raised when two former RC-135
intelligence specialists who had piloted the craft went public in
the Denver Post with information from their experience. T.
Edward Eskelson and Tom Bernard wrote that the official
explanation of the RC-135's mission off the Soviet coast did
not agree with their knowledge.

"The RC-135 can stay aloft for 18 to 20 hours,
demanding only a single mid-air refueling. The aircraft
are assigned 'orbit' areas near target nations by the
National Security Agency, which has operational
authority over all the personnel aboard.

"It has been our experience that, on occasion, NSA
adjusts the flight paths of RC-135s so that they will
intentionally penetrate the airspace of a target nation,
bringing a target country's air defense systems into a
state of alert. This allows NSA to analyze these
activated systems for potential flaws and weaknesses.

"The RC-1 35 acts for the NSA as a prime receptor of
signals from a surveillance target. The aircraft is
deemed so important to U.S. intelligence collection
efforts in sensitive areas that it always is relieved on its
orbit by another RC-135 just before the conclusion of
its mission. We find the implication made by President
Reagan that the Sakhalin-Kamchatka target area was
abandoned by the RC-135 to be unbelievable and
contrary to NSA policy.

"The capabilities of the RC-135, some of them
offensive, may have been of particular value to the
KAL 747 as it moved toward, and eventually through,
Soviet airspace.

"The RC-135 has a superadvanced, ultrasecure
communications system linked to the most sophisti-
cated communications network in the world. This
system permits the instant reporting of tactical
intelligence to the highest levels of government,
including the president, from any location in the
world. A message for the president is required to be in
his hands no more than 10 minutes after the actual time
of transmission."

They next pointed out that the RC-135 had the capability
to communicate directly with the 747, and could have
notified its crew that the plane was off course and was being
tracked by the Soviets.

"Another feature of the RC-135 is the equipment
manned by Strategic Air Command officers which can
'jam' radar and radio transmissions in addition to
certain electronic systems in other aircraft.

"The RC-135 also contains an internal warning sys-
tem that monitors all radar and tactical air activity of
the target nation for the earliest indication of any
hostile activity that could be directed against the RC-135."

In a later interview with a Denver weekly newspaper,
Westword, Bernard said, "That leads us back to one thing.
We had coverage, we had analysis, we had the ability to inter-
cede — and we didn't." He could suggest only two possible
reasons why: either the U.S. had complicity, or feared com-
promising an intelligence source more than it was concerned
about the lives of those aboard KAL 007. He concluded,
"Personally, I think the Korean airhner overflew Soviet
airspace for the purpose of gathering intelligence."

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 41

Former CIA case officer Ralph McGehee reached a
similar conclusion: "The KAL plane was sent loaded with
espionage equipment into Soviet airspace in accordance
with a secret agreement between the governments of the
United States and South Korea, but with the incorrect
assumption that it would not be shot down since it was a
commercial flight."

Stories on National Public Radio and in the Boston Globe
documented that Korean Air Lines has had "a long and
intimate relationship" with the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency, and that KCIA, in turn, has a similarly cozy tie to
U.S. intelligence agencies. Even former CIA director
Stansfield Turner told a student audience that he couldn't
swear on a Bible that KAL007 wasn't engaged in spying.

Leslie Gelb in the New York Times, while generally
supporting the official U.S. position, listed what the
government was withholding: "Worldwide American radio
and radar abilities; any communications between the RC-
135 and the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and between
Flight 007 and the somewhat earlier Korean Air Lines
flight from Anchorage to Seoul, and communications
between Soviet ground controllers and fighter planes."

The Sunday Times of London summed up its investiga-
tion by saying that "there is growing conviction in military,
political, and aviation circles that Captain Byong-in was
not in Soviet airspace by accident."

Far Eastern Economic Review was more forceful. "How
did 007 get to its rendezvous with disaster? An error in the"
INS (Inertial Navigational System) which would have taken
it exactly where it was going — a million to one chance — has
to be added to another million to one chance: that the two
pilots on the flight deck never once noticed Kamchatka's
coastline appearing on their weather radar — which has a
range of about 200 miles — or even looked out of the cockpit
window to see that they were flying over land where there
should have been sea. And this in an area where maps are
studded with warnings to pilots to stay on course."

The actual notice reads, "WARNING Aircraft infringing
upon Non-Free Flying Territory may be fired on without
warning."

The Review concurred with the logical consensus.
"These coincidences strain credulity and force an examina-
tion of a simpler explanation: that the aircraft was for some
reason deliberately flown on the course that it took."

What might its spy mission have been?

In a Newsday article, David Kahn wrote, "Although the
official U.S. statement declared that the RC-135 was
checking on Soviet compliance with disarmament treaties,
more often these reconnaissance planes, nicknamed
'ferrets,' seek information on Soviet radars. Specifics about
radar locations and their power, pulse rate and frequency
can enable U.S. bombers to blind the Soviet radars by
jamming them, or to trick — spoof — them into showing,
not the true radar echoes of the bombers, but false ones
that show incorrect distances and speeds. This can provide
the bombers with an electronic shield in case they must
attack the Soviet Union."

Especially in the age of Stealth technology with its nearly
invisible radar signature, such tests are probably common
in the face of likely attempts to improve radar defenses.

A New York Times report by David Schribman says that
Soviet ground controllers encountered difficulty in directing
the Soviet planes on courses that would intercept KAL 007,
a serious problem for aircraft with limited range. If this

report is true, the only reasonable explanation is that the
RC-135 was jamming Soviet radar as the 747 violated
Soviet airspace, expecting to win a red badge if successful,
and perhaps assuming that, in the event the test failed, the
Soviet pilots would refrain from shooting down a
commercial flight. That might also explain, if "friendly"
(U.S. and Japanese) radar was also being jammed, why
nobody warned the Korean crew that their plane was off
course, and why the U.S. won't release information that
could conclusively show what was happening during the
fateful flight.

If that's the truth, or close to it, the Korean-U.S. spy
team failed to take an important consideration into
account. David Kahn summed it up:

"Soviet leaders perhaps remember something that exerts
as powerful an influence on them as the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor does to Americans. It may explain their fear
and rage about air intrusions. From October 1940 to June
1941, German airplanes— toward the end averaging more
than three a day— penetrated Russian airspace and
photographed thousands of square miles of the Soviet
Union. June 22, Hitler invaded." •

DEADLY DECEITS

My 25 Years in the CIA

By Ralph W. McGehee

Ralph McGehee spent 25 years in the
CIA, much of it as a case officer in southeast
Asia. He saw the folly of the Vietnam War
and argued, to no avail, with the likes of
William Colby. This is his timely story of
how the CIA distorts reality to conform to
the political line coming from Washington.

Also available from the publisher: White
Paper? Whitewash! by Philip Agee and
Warner Poelchau on the CIA and El
Salvador.

Sheridan Square Publications, Inc.

P.O. Box 677

New York, NY 10013

Please send me:

( ) copies of Deadly Deceits, hardcover, at $14.95
plus $1.75 postage and handling.

( ) copies of Deadly Deceits, paperback, at $7.95
plus $1.50 postage and handling.

( ) copies of White Paper? Whitewash! hard-
cover, at $12.95 plus $1.75 postage and
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( ) copies of White Paper? Whitewash! paper-
back, at $6.50 plus $1.50 postage and
handling.

v /

42 CovertAction

Number 20 (Winter 1984)

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Number 20 (Winter 1984): The Invasion of Grenada; War in Nicaragua; Fort Huachuca; Israel and South Korea in Central America; KAL Flight 007

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Number 20 (Winter 1984)

CovertAction 43

Sources and Methods:

CIA Assassinations — Part IV

By Ken Lawrence

When the topic is assassination, U.S. officials exhibit a
curious ambivalence. On the one hand, we'd never, never
even consider such a thing. On the other hand, a casual,
yawning, "So, what else is new?"

No one is surprised when right-wing Cuban exiles, armed
and trained by the CIA, kill or attempt to kill Cuban or
Soviet diplomats stationed in New York.

Last August 8, after reporting on a "hair-raising new
development"— that Arab terrorists have invented an
"invisible bomb"- Jack Anderson coolly disclosed that
"none of the western intelligence agencies privy to the secret
raised objections when one agency set out to find the bomb
maker and eliminate him and his lethal products k with
extreme prejudice/" If Anderson's account is accurate^the
CIA officials he says are involved in this are explicitly
violating stated policy.

On October 26. Frank Greve of Knight-Ridder News
Service quoted Brooks McClure, a retired veteran Foreign
Service officer and terrorism specialist, as having said that
when the group that bombed the Marines in Beirut is found
out, they will be quietly "disposed of. It's more effective
against your real enemies if you take them out and never talk
about it."

"Don't talk about it" is also the solution proposed by
William F. Buckley, Jr.. himself a former CIA officer, to

♦Part I appeared in C'AIB Number 8 ( March-April 1 980): Part 2 appeared
in Number I I (December 1 9S0); Pari 3 in Number 17 (Summer 19X2).

CtoveiiAction

INFORMATION BULLETIN
P.O. Box 50272
Washington, DC 20004

what he considers the occasional need for assassination
despite an official ban on it. Last June he wrote, "But isn't
assassination wrong?

"Yes assassination is wrong. But can't one say that
assassination is wrong, but that there are worse things than
assassinations? Like death for a quarter million people, and
perhaps a war?

"Yes, one can say that." In that case, do it but don't talk
about it.

Once begun, this sort of thing becomes a way of life. That
has happened in Central America. The former U.S.
ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, appeared on the
Today show last April 14 to describe what he had learned on
a recent trip to Central America. Among other things. White
mentioned that he had talked with a mercenary trained by
the CIA and paid to assassinate leaders of Nicaragua.

White's revelation came almost two months before the
Nicaraguan government expelled three U.S. diplomats lor
plotting the murder of Nicaragua's foreign minister. Miguel
D'Escoto Brockman. The three^ Ermila Loretta Rodriguez.
David Greig, and Linda Pfeifel were identified as principal
figures in a CIA network who had attempted to recruit
Marlene Moncada to kill D'Escoto, who is also a priest.

They gave her a shortwave radio to receive coded
messages, two wooden idols in which cypher keys were

(Continued on page 39-)

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Number 20 (Winter 1984)